Okay, so let’s jump right into it!
(Oh and by the way, you can read my opening essay here)
I.
We’re all in this together!
So, once again, I would like
to thank Mar for agreeing to engage with me in this written debate. I am much
more grateful than ever before, especially now that I’ve read his opening essay/reply. In discussing huge issues like the existence of God (or more
accurately in the case of this debate, whether or not the first cause is God),
he is exactly the right conversation partner. He’s honest and zealous in
knowing the truth. Discourse will be better if all people have those traits.
Before I answer his
objections, it’s important to reiterate for all readers that our agreements and
disagreements are now clear. Allow me to restate our common ground: both I and
Mar agree that causal finitism is true and therefore there is at
least one first cause. Mar stated in his opening essay that these
agreements “(put) a tremendous amount of argumentation off (his) plate”. The
same thing can be said for me. Arguing for the reality of causation and its
finitude is a stressful thing to do, and thankfully I won’t bother doing so.
The possible objections I outlined on my opening essay can be set aside, then –
except the objection related to Hume’s view on causation. I want to restate a
point I made there. We’ll get back to that later.
Anyway, now that our
agreements are clear, I also want to point out some things in his opening essay
that may be trivial for some, but concerns me nonetheless, for it might affect
how readers will assess the discussion between us.
II.
Brief comments on a couple of points
Just the “Christian God”?
Early on his essay, Mar
writes that he “blatantly disagree(s) with the main aim of my argument”,
namely, my aim to avoid arguing for a “specific god(s) of a specific
religion/belief system”. The reason? It seems to me that for him, if I cannot
establish through my argument that a specific god of a specific religion
exists, then I failed in arguing for God’s existence. I think this
understanding is affirmed by his statement after the quote above:
We may
conclude together that the universe had a first cause, but that doesn't mean I
have to accept that this first cause must be labeled a "God." In
order for you to elevate the conclusion of the Kalam Cosmological Argument from
a "first cause" to a "God," then you would need specificity
- a reference point that we may directly compare if this first cause indeed
matches with the attributes of a specific god. And that is the reason why I
chose to title my opening remarks as written above. (Emphasis mine) If we cannot agree on the mere definitions
alone, then I'm afraid this debate is over before it even began.
End quote.
The title of his opening essay is “Does (the Christian) God Exist?” So, it
seems to me then that this “reference point” that is needed for me to “specify”
that the first cause is indeed God is, according to Mar, exclusively the
Christian reference point. I needed a standard, you might say, for
argumentation that points to how we understand the Christian God alone.
The first
thing that came into my mind is that Mar is actually right, or at least
partially right. Being a Christian myself, I cannot use an argument that
will point to a god that differs from Christianity, otherwise problems will
arise: I may prove the existence of a god, but I have disproven the very
foundation of my Christian faith. So, to say that I need a “Christian reference
point” is somehow, someway correct.
But again,
he’s only partially right. If he’s saying that my standard should only be “exclusively
Christian”, then I would say that’s where his mistake is. I believe my standard
can be used by other people from other faiths too in order to prove the
existence of a Divine first cause. Of course, this doesn’t mean these people
from other faiths automatically worship and/or believe the same God as me if we
use the same standard, but again: this doesn’t entail they cannot use the same
standard. Consider this analogy: two guitarists can use the same type of
guitar, but this doesn’t entail that they’ll be producing the same music out of
it. Similarly, two theists may use the same standard for argumentation, but
that doesn’t mean they will end up in the same religion, or end up in the same
concept of God. Sure, their philosophical view of God may be similar,
but when it comes to religion (specifically the three major monotheistic
religions: Christianity, Islam, Judaism), philosophizing about God isn’t
enough. There’s also what we can know via divine revelation that is outside the
grasp of philosophy, like what’s written on the Bible. If Mar insists that
the God I ought to prove is exclusively the Biblical God, then that would
introduce a different topic in this time, because we are debating God’s
existence, not whether Christian revelation is true.
His point
seems to be connected to another statement he made on the fifth section of his
essay, entitled “The Problem”:
And this is
also the point where you have failed your previous aim that this argument
supposedly is not to prove the existence of a specific god of a specific
religion or belief system, because clearly, you are now referring to the very
specific belief system of the monotheistic religion of the Abrahamic God. These attributes (which cannot be found in any other
religion) effectively narrows down
the choices of "God," from a whopping 2,500 worshipped deities, to
just two - either Allah or Yahweh.
Again, saying that my
argument “narrows down the choices of ‘God’” from 2,500 to only two is correct.
After all, not all the concept of deities belonging to the 2,500 is compatible
to the real God I’m arguing for the existence of. But just because my
argumentation eliminates the possibility of the existence of other gods and leads
to a possible entry to a specific religion doesn’t mean my argumentation leads
exclusively to a god of a specific religion. Mar said it himself: we are
still left with 2 choices if my argument is correct. But again, the discussion
as to which God is the true God (Allah or Yahweh?) is a different discussion.
Before we settle that issue, we have to settle precisely the issue that I and
Mar are supposed to be debating about: does God exist? Only then can we proceed
asking which God of a religion is the true God (or probably philosophical
theism alone is true).
Solution to the Thomson’s
lamp
I also want to briefly
consider his proposed solution to the Thomson’s lamp paradox: it’s impossible
to divide the smallest “chunk” of space/time. This entails that we cannot
divide the timeframe wherein the lamp will toggle will from on to off
infinitely many times.
I have nothing against
this solution. In fact, I can even support the solution by saying that the
paradox fails to distinguish between actual and potential infinites,
but I digress. All I wanted to point out for now is that Mar’s solution vindicates
causal finitism. If we cannot divide the timeframe wherein the lamp will
toggle will from on to off infinitely many times, then we cannot push the
lamp’s button infinitely and therefore cause the lamp to toggle from on to off.
So, again, whether or not causal finitism is true is no longer an issue now.
The Argument to the Best
Explanation
I also wanted to say
something about how Mar has presented my argument to the best explanation for
causal finitism. And I want to make this point not for him, but for the ones
who will read our exchanges. He actually has no problem with the argument, it
seems, only that “just because we have the best explanation, doesn't mean that
it's the true explanation”. This is true, but my fear is that those who didn’t
read my opening would think that this argument is not as strong as it is.
I gave the infinite deck of cards scenario to support the argument and
to show that the argument is not really weak as it might seem at first glance.
My other concern is that since Mar only talked about my argument to the best
explanation, this argument might overshadow my other, stronger argument for
causal finitism, namely, the argument from the patchwork principle. I won’t
expound on it too much here. I just want to direct the reader to check out my
opening essay if he hasn’t yet.
III.
The Gap Problem: Where the Battle is
Waged
Mar made it clear on the
outset that “the only thing (he) will be disagreeing to is the latter part of
(my) argument”. Specifically, he disagrees on premise (8): For a necessary
being to exist is for God to exist (a premise I supported by further argumentation:
stages 16-60). He even said that I’ve “given (him) all the tools needed in
order to disprove” the said premise.
That’s a bold claim.
Indeed, in presenting him my argument for God’s existence, I gave him his
“target”. But that’s not the important thing for Mar. What’s important is that
he can pull the trigger and hit the said target. In responding to my essay, was
he successful in doing so?
Can you “Imagine”?
The first issue Mar has
raised is with regards to the First Cause being One (stages 30-38). The reason
I gave for the First Cause just being single is that for a kind/genus to have
multiple members, the objects of a kind/genus has to have differentiating
principles. The First Cause, on the other hand, cannot have differentiating
principles. Hence, there cannot be multiple First Causes. He raises two
objections about this.
First, he says that I
have committed the non sequitur fallacy in proving the singleness of the
First Cause. He claims that it doesn’t follow that “to be First Cause with
differentiating principle (sic) is also to be composed of parts”.
I have two problems with
this. First, Mar merely asserted that I committed the fallacy, but he didn’t
tell us how I committed any fallacy at all. He only said that he can
“imagine” multiple first causes (we’ll come back to this later). Second, how
does Mar define the word “part”? He didn’t tell us at all in his opening essay.
He has to give a definition of the word “part” that would support his claim that
a differentiating principle cannot be considered a part, or at least a
definition that would support his claim that a differentiating principle
might count as a part sometimes, but not all the time, and prove that when it
comes to the First Cause, if it has a differentiating principle, it isn’t a
part of the First Cause. Let’s see if he can give such a definition in his
rebuttal. For now, allow me to give my definition of a “part”:
A part is that which is
in a thing, whether metaphysically or physically, but is not identical to the
thing.[i]
For example, my eyes
which enables me to see is a part of me because it is in me but it isn’t
me. Another example is a LeBron James. LeBron is a part of the Los Angeles
Lakers because he belongs to the Los Angeles Lakers but he isn’t the
Los Angeles Lakers.
Now, by that definition,
just in case the First cause has a differentiating principle, it will be a part
of the First cause if it is in the First Cause but it isn’t the
First Cause. Now, this is exactly what I meant when referring to things
in a genus when I said “(i)n order to say that there are multiple things
contained in a single genus, we have to find differentiating principles in
all the things in that genus”, because the differentiating principles
are in the things of the genus but is not the things in the genus themselves,
much less the genus itself. And from this follows the fact that the genus I
am a part of, namely, the genus of animal, has different and multiple species
in it, and those species have different and multiple beings belonging to them,
because the species and beings that is encompassed by the genus have
differentiating principles in them which may be in them but not
identical to them, hence these differentiating principles are just parts of
them.
So, to specify, the human
species is a part of the genus of animal and is different from
other species inside the same genus because it is not animality itself,
but animality plus a part, a differentiating principle, namely,
rationality. I am part of the human species and am different from other
humans because I am not humanity itself, but humanity plus a
differentiating principle, a part, namely, my specific weight, height, brain
wiring, spatio-temporal location, etc.
Apply this to the First
cause, which, in the stages prior to arguing for its being One (stages 24-30),
is proven to be Ipsum Esse Subsistens/Existence itself, or that which
its essence is just to exist, and we would have an incoherent, and therefore
impossible, conclusion. For the First Cause, which is Existence itself, to be
just a part of the wider kind of that which is Existence itself (and therefore
the possibility of that which is Existence itself to be many, thus having those
which are existence themselves), it has to have a differentiating
principle, and therefore a part, that would distinguish it to others who are
also existence themselves. But as I have argued in the fifth section of my
opening essay, this would make that which is Existence itself to be Existence
itself plus a differentiating principle, thus making Him not Existence
itself, just like I am not humanity itself, nor humanity animality itself.
That would give Him a part that is in Him but not identical to Him. But
the first cause cannot have parts (stages 24-27), and thus cannot have a
differentiating principle. The first cause, therefore, cannot be many. The
charge of non sequitur, then, is missing the point: to have a
differentiating principle is indeed to have a part, and the inference to the
singleness of the First Cause stands.
Mar also asked the
following question: “Isn’t classifying the First Cause in terms of ‘genus’, as
if the science of Taxonomy developed by Carl Linnaeus can apply to biological
beings as well as transcendent beings, borders a bit on the absurd?” The
primary error in his assumption (this is trivial, but is an error nonetheless)
is that terms such as “genus” and “species” are mere terminological
developments in the field of natural science. This is not true. For
2,300 years, arguably starting from Aristotle’s time, these terms have already
been used both in the field of philosophy and science[ii], and it is in the
philosophical way that I have used such terms. Also, even if we grant his
preferred definition of those terms, it actually supports my claim that the
First Cause is One. Exactly, to classify the First Cause in a genus is
absurd. That is precisely the point. The First Cause transcends such
classification and cannot be a part of it. This is why, unlike those which
are parts of some genus who can be many, the First Cause cannot be many, and
therefore only One.
His other strategy is to
say that the First Cause can be multiple is because he “can easily imagine
a scenario where four First Causes could independently exist alongside each
other” and that the argument for the singleness of the First Cause just stems
from “a lack of imagination and from an internal bias that insists the First
Cause must be singular”. I have two points to give about this as well. First,
if he’s correct that my inference is in error just because he can imagine a
scenario that is contrary to the conclusion of my inference, then what can stop
me, or any theist for that matter, to say that any argument/proof/evidence for
Atheism/against God fails because “I can easily imagine a scenario where a
single Divine Being, Who is the Lord of all, exists in a heavenly realm” and
that the atheist’s denial of God is just due to a “lack of imagination and an
internal bias that insists that such a Being does not exist”? Would Mar accept
such reason? I don’t think so, and neither should we accept his, because in
order to assess an argument, we should go beyond what we can form mental
pictures of.
Second – and this is
where my reiteration of the problem with Hume’s view on causation enters – Mar
is the one committing the non sequitur fallacy. Hume’s error with
regards to his view on causation is that just because such-and-such a thing is
imaginable, therefore for such-and-such a thing can obtain in reality: just
because an effect can be imagined without a cause doesn’t mean it can exist
without a cause. Mar’s reasoning commits a similar error: just because Mar, or
anybody, can imagine four First Causes of the whole created reality doesn’t
mean there are indeed four First Causes in reality. He has to engage in
the arguments I gave for singleness of the First Cause (he did, by accusing me
of committing the non sequitur fallacy, but as we’ve seen, he failed)
and tell us how my reasoning is flawed/in error. So far, he hasn’t given any
good reason to deny the validity and soundness of my argument.
God as Ipsum Esse
Subsistens and the apparent Incoherence of His Attributes
The next objections Mar
gave is with regards to God’s being Supernatural, Omnipotent, Immaterial, and
Immutable (or unchanging). But before he got to that stage, he requested that I
give a much simpler explanation of the term “Ipsum Esse Subsistens”.
This request from him is
important on my part because his objections against the coherence of some of
the First Cause’s attributes, such as the ones related to unchangeability, can
be answered once I properly explicate the concept of God as Ipsum Esse
Subsistens. So, allow me to give an outline on how philosophers and theologians
like Thomas Aquinas arrived at the said concept.
In the fourth chapter of his
short work on metaphysics entitled De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas gives
the following analysis on how things around us can lead towards the reality of
a primary cause that is just Esse Tantum (Pure Existence/Existence
alone):
Everything
that pertains to a thing, however, either is caused by the principles of its own
nature, as risibility in man, or else comes from some extrinsic principle, as
light in the air from the influence of the sun. Now, it cannot be that
existence itself is caused by the very form or quiddity of the thing (I mean as
by an efficient cause), because then the thing would be its own efficient
cause, and the thing would produce itself in existence, which is impossible.
Therefore, everything the existence of which is other than its own nature has
existence from another. And since everything that is through another is reduced
to that which is through itself as to a first cause, there is something that is
the cause of existing in all things in that this thing is existence only.
Otherwise, we would have to go to infinity in causes, for everything that is
not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as said above. It is clear,
therefore, that the intelligences are form and existence and have existence
from the first being, which is existence alone, and this is the first cause,
which is God.[iii]
Things around
us are composed of essence (what they are) and existence (that
they are). For Aquinas and other Thomists, essence and existence are
distinct from one another: what a thing is doesn’t entail that it is. Aquinas’
first reason for the distinction is that we can understand a thing’s essence
without knowing whether or not it exists. You can, for instance, explain what a
dinosaur is to a child who hasn’t heard about dinosaurs yet, but once the child
understood the definition, this won’t entail that the child will automatically
know that dinosaurs still exist or not.[iv] But is
this a real distinction? What if this is just a conceptual distinction,
or a mere distinction made by the mind, but not in reality?
Aquinas gives
further reasons as to why the distinction between essence and existence is
indeed a real, and not just a distinction made by our minds[v]:
For, there
can be no plurification of something except by the addition of some difference,
as the nature of a genus is multiplied in its species; or as, since the form is
received in diverse matters, the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse
individuals; or again as when one thing is absolute and another is received in
something else, as if there were a certain separate heat that was other than
unseparated heat by reason of its own separation. But if we posit a thing that
is existence only, such that it is subsisting existence itself, this existence
will not receive the addition of a difference, for, if there were added a
difference, there would be not only existence but existence and also beyond
this some form; much less would such a thing receive the addition of matter,
for then the thing would be not subsisting existence but material existence.
Hence, it remains that a thing that is its own existence cannot be other than
one, and so in every other thing, the thing's existence is one thing, and its
essence or quiddity or nature or form is another. In the intelligences,
therefore, there is existence beyond the form, and so we say that an
intelligence is form and existence.
The reader
might notice a similarity with Aquinas’ way of reasoning to the one I employed
for arguing for the Oneness of the First Cause. Suppose there is something
whose essence is just its existence. That thing cannot be just one of the many
others that belong to a genus of that which just is existence, because that
would imply a differentiating principle that is possessed by that whose essence
is just its existence. But that would mean that this thing is that which just
is existence itself plus a differentiating principle, which would not
make it that which just is existence itself. That whose essence is just its existence
cannot be material as well, because to be material is to be individuated and
particularized by a particular parcel of matter (which, by the way, can also be
considered a differentiating principle: I am different from other humans
because I possess a different parcel of matter – a different set of flesh and
bones – from other humans). A thing whose essence just is its existence cannot
have a particular parcel of matter, for that would make it that which whose
essence is just is its existence plus a particular parcel of matter,
which would not make it that whose essence just is its existence. But the
things around as are pluralized – there different humans, cats, dogs, chairs,
trees – and therefore have differentiating principles. The things around us are
also material things/those which possess a particular parcel of matter. Hence,
the things around us have their essences distinct from their existence.
Another
argument can be made for the distinction between essence and existence when it
comes to the things around us is that if their essences is just their
existence, then they would be necessary, they would just have to exist. But the
things around need not exist. In fact, the things around us expire and corrupt
over time. Hence, the things around us have their essences distinct from their
existence.
For Aquinas,
existence is the primary source of actualization, the act of all acts.
And this is just plain obvious, I think: all our capacities, powers, abilities,
etc. are grounded on our being existing things. We won’t have those
things if we are non-existent. Existence, then, is the primary principle of
actualization, without which there is nothing.
But where
does this principle of actualization come from for those which have their
essences distinct from their existence? We go back to what Aquinas has said in
one of the quotes above: “(n)ow, it cannot be that existence itself is caused
by the very form or quiddity of the thing (I mean as by an efficient cause),
because then the thing would be its own efficient cause, and the thing would
produce itself in existence, which is impossible.” It cannot come from the
essence, because the essence is precisely that which needs actualization,
otherwise we will have an instance of self-causation, which is absurd. So, as
Aquinas concludes: “(t)herefore, everything the existence of which is other
than its own nature has existence from another”. The existence of those which
have their essences distinct from their existence comes from an external
principle.
Once we come
to this part of Aquinas’ reasoning, we have come to the reality of causation
when it comes to existence: that which receives a thing/principle stands in
potency to that thing/principle. Since essence is that which receives
existence when it comes to the things around us, essence, then, is the
principle of potency in a thing. The potency that existence, which is the
principle of actualization of a thing, actualizes is the essence. This is
precisely what the principle of causation is for Thomism: potentials are only
actualized by those which are already actual. The existence of
essence-existence composites is, then, a caused existence.
The reality
of causation sets up, automatically, a causal regress: does this causal regress
go on forever or is there a primary cause, a thing which has its existence
uncaused, and therefore that which just is existence itself, that is the
foundation of the regress, prior to which there is nothing?
Aquinas
reasons that the latter is true: “(a)nd since everything that is through
another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause, there
is something that is the cause of existing in all things in that this thing is
existence only”. By what Thomistic philosopher Gaven Kerr calls the per
aliud principle (that which has a thing through another has that which has
that thing per se as primary cause) and by virtue of the per se causal
series (I won’t expound on it here since (1) I think Mar has an idea of what a per
se causal series is, since he mentioned that he debated a good friend of
mine, Mark Steven Pandan, on the Aristotelian proof, and also (2) he accepts
that causation cannot stretch forever), Aquinas concludes that those which are
composed of essence and existence “have existence from the first being, which
is existence alone (esse tantum), and this is the first cause”. This
first cause is that whose essence is just to exist. It does not have a
distinction between essence and existence. Rather, its essence is just
existence. This same cause is what Thomstic philosophers call that which is
Subsistent Being Itself, or in Latin, Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Those
which are distinct from it only have created existence (Esse Commune).
Only that which is Ipsum Esse Subsistens is Esse Tantum.
It must also
be obvious for all that even if my procedure for arguing for the existence of
the First Cause is different from Aquinas’ procedure in the De Ente, we
have nonetheless reached the same conclusion: the first cause must be Ipsum
Esse Subsistens, that which is Existence itself, deriving its existence from
nothing external to it.
If existence
is the primary principle of actualization, and if that which is Esse Tantum is
just pure existence, then it is purely actual, without any passivity
whatsoever in it, unlike creatures, who have passivity in them and therefore
can be affected and change/have their potentials actualized.
And so, we
now come to the errors of Mar’s objections. He accuses me of committing the
fallacy of hasty generalization in connection to the immateriality of the First
Cause. According to him, just because the material things we observe are
changing, this doesn’t mean all material things are changeable. I would
even go further and steelman Mar’s argument: if this is the case, then what
eliminates the possibility of an unchanging yet material First Cause and
therefore have a naturalistic picture of reality (like atheist philosopher
Graham Oppy’s preferred explanation of ultimate reality, namely, physical
simples)? And if this is possible, then why prefer that the First Cause is
supernatural given Ockham’s razor?
This is where
he got it wrong: if the First Cause is only One and only it can be Esse
Tantum/purely actual without any passivity whatsoever, then anything
besides it have esse commune only and therefore have potencies. To have
potencies is, of course, to have the capacity/possibility for change. Anything
besides the Esse Tantum, is therefore capable of changing,
whether material or immaterial (at least change once, but that’s still a
change nonetheless). We need not appeal to every single material thing in order
to establish this.
And isn’t
that what exactly I didn’t do? I never appealed to material
things in general in all of my stages prior to proving the First Cause’s
being One. I made it clear as I was explicating the reasons as to why the First
cause Cannot be multiple: a description of the whole created material reality
was never part of the argumentation prior to proving the said stage, it
was rather just a consequence of it.
In the part
wherein I argued for the Aristotelian concept of form and matter contra materialistic
reductionism, I also have given my preferred metaphysics of materiality, which
entailed that material things do have passivity in them and can indeed
change/be corrupted. Mar didn’t give a counter-argument against it, and it
seems to me that he has no problem with it. But if that’s the case, then he has
to accept the fact that materiality has the feature of changeability in it.
The next
objection is with regards to the First Cause’s attribute of unchangeability.
Mar gave an amazing objection that in order for the First Cause to cause
creation, it must undergo internal change when it comes to its choice. Prior to
creation, according to Mar, the First Cause must choose to create first. And as
we all know, choosing involves a change within the one who does the
choosing, namely, going from the state of not making the choice to the
state of making the choice. The First Cause, then, in order to choose to
create, must change. But, according to my argument, the First Cause cannot change.
The concept of the First Cause being unchangeable is therefore incoherent.
Again, this
is an amazing objection, but “amazing” isn’t identical to “correct”. Just like
what I pointed above – that Mar accuses me of committing the non sequitur fallacy when in fact I didn’t and actually he’s the
one who did – he is actually the one committing the fallacy of hasty
generalization here. When it comes to human action, causation, and choice,
there is indeed a change within us. This means that when it
comes to us, the difference
principle applies when it comes to
our actions, namely, a difference
in effects presupposes a difference in the cause(s). If I choose to walk towards the destination I desire to go to, I will
go toward it in a slower way compared to if I chose to run toward the said
destination. This is an instance of the difference principle: a change in the
effect (my speed) presupposes a difference in the cause (my choice to either
run or walk).
Mar thinks that just because the
difference principle applies to us, it must also therefore apply to God/the
First Cause,
thereby generalizing the principle with no warrant as to why we should at all. Given
that the First Cause is purely actual, without any passivity in Him whatsoever,
this implies that there can be no internal change in Him, even if those outside
Him, namely, creation,
can change, or go from being to non-being, due to their passivity inherent in
them. Changes in creation therefore does not imply a change in the First Cause.
Given my argument (or Aquinas’, for that matter), the difference principle does
not apply to the God-creation causal relationship, even if it may apply to the
creature-creature causal relationship.
Mar also fails to distinguish between real changes and cambridge changes. A real change in a thing is a change in the
thing itself, while a mere cambridge change is just a change external to the thing. If yesterday, Socrates is
taller than Plato, and today, Socrates is suddenly shorter than Plato, this
need not imply a real change in
Socrates, since this can just mean that Plato grew taller than Socrates, not
that Socrates suddenly became shorter than Plato. The change in height, then,
is only in Plato, not Socrates. Plato’s change in height is just a mere cambridge change in Socrates, not really a change
in Socrates.
The same thing applies to the First
Cause and His relationship to creation and its changeability. Any change in
creation and its existential status does not imply a real change in the First
Cause at all. All it requires is change external to the
First Cause. What is needed to account for any change in creation is just
cambridge changes in the First Cause, then, without any real changes in it. The bottom line is this: Mar fails to distinguish between the
First Cause’s/Esse Tantum’s
one, simple, unchanging self-existence and the effects of
this said self-existence: the effects of the First Cause/Esse Tantum can change, but this need not
presuppose a change in the First cause whatsoever.
A final point I wanted to make is the
distinction between active and passive potencies[vi]. Active potencies are a things’
capacity to act
upon another thing, while passive potencies
are a thing’s capacity to be acted upon by other things[vii].
Given that the First Cause is purely actual without any passivity whatsoever,
it cannot have any passive potency in it, but this doesn’t mean it cannot have
active potencies. Indeed, given that the First Cause is the cause of everything
beside itself, it can and is acting upon creation
(by its one and simple act of existence, of course). But again, active
potencies are not the same as passive potencies, and therefore the First
Cause’s capacity to act upon other things doesn’t entail/presuppose that the First Cause can be acted upon by other things. This is another distinction that Mar has failed to
see.
This also means that Mar misses the
point when he said that if the First Cause is unchanging, then it is a “static
entity” and that it is “completely lifeless… (without the ability to) make
proactive decisions”, because, given the First Cause’s nature as purely actual,
then it is precisely the opposite of being static and being lifeless. Being
pure actuality and the ultimate source of actuality of all things, the First
Cause’s nature is pure dynamism in
and of itself and transcends life as we know it, for He is the immanent cause of life itself. In fact,
one could even say that the First Cause, being the sustaining cause of
everything other than itself, is pure life,
without any hint of lifelessness in its being, given that it engages in pure
dynamism.
Mar also pointed out that my model of
God means that God is “emotionless” and “without the capacity for any other
anthropomorphized ability”. I don’t know what he is trying to prove here,
because this
is precisely the point.
God transcends
mere anthropomorphizing.
After all, if God exists, why should His nature be in any way similar to/like
the nature of creatures like us, humans? Mar seems to think that my model of
God is a God who just differs from creation only in degree.
It’s as if the true God’s intelligence, say, is just the same as my
intelligence, or Albert Einstein’s, only without the limitations of the latter. I am sympathetic with Mar if he
denies the existence of such a god, because that isn’t God at all. God cannot be part of the same hierarchy of being
that creatures are a part of, strictly speaking. Again, He is Esse Tantum, while creatures only have esse commune. Just by that very fact, He transcends
everything beside Himself, and that includes anthropomorphic features.
I am thinking that once Mar reads the
paragraph above, it is possible that he will object that if that’s how I
conceive of God, then I automatically have disproven the existence of the
Biblical God. After all, isn’t the God of the Bible a God with anthropomorphic
features, such as the capacity to get angry or to love? I won’t expound on my
answer against this objection, at least not yet – not until Mar raises such an
objection himself. For now, this is all I can say: one cannot just trot out
Bible verses in order to prove/disprove a model of God. One has to have the
right metaphysical backdrop in order to look at such verses. Only then can one
give texts from Scripture as proofs. This means that before Mar gives arguments
from the Bible, he has to give counter-arguments against my metaphysical views
first.
After giving the objections we have
seen above, Mar writes:
Therefore (sic) the First Cause may be material, it may be
immaterial, it may be changing or unchanging, who knows? As you have said
earlier in this essay, "There are no evidences for
such speculations, that’s for sure. But there are also no evidences against
them." So we are now left with zero answers with regards to
the First Cause being material, changing, or the opposite.
End quote. The first thing to point out here is that Mar has
taken that sentence I wrote which he quoted out of its proper context. I wrote
that about William Lane Craig’s way for arguing for the second premise of his
Kalam, not about the version of the Kalam I am defending in this written
debate. This is the full context that surrounds the said sentence:
First, I am not convinced
with the scientific evidence that Craig uses to defend (2), and I can break
this reason down into two sub-reasons. The first one is this: he will commonly
appeal to scientific findings from big bang cosmology or the second law of
thermodynamics. Even if we grant that those findings are true, those
findings cannot prove that the start of created reality is identical to the
start of our universe. Who knows? Maybe there was a created reality before
the big bang. May be there was a universe prior to our universe, or even a
bunch of multiverses that existed prior to ours. There are no evidences for
such speculations, that’s for sure. But there are also no evidences against
them.
Mar’s quotation of the
sentences makes it seem that I am saying it about my argument for the divinity
for the First Cause, thereby making me look as if I am uncertain that
the First Cause is indeed God. If one has read my opening essay properly, one
will know that this is indeed not the case. We have also seen that the last
sentence that he wrote in that paragraph – that we are left with “zero answers
with regards to the First Cause being material, unchanging, or the opposite” –
is not true, for we have seen that his objections against such attributes fail.
And since his objection against the said attributes fail, his disagreement with
me that the First Cause is therefore supernatural fails as well. Until he gives
good reasons against my inference about the First Cause being God, the
inference stands.
Scientism lurking in the
background
Afterwards, Mar pointed
out that even if it is the case that the First Cause is supernatural, we cannot
arrive to that conclusion because we cannot demonstrate it given that the First
Cause is, as I’ve said in my opening essay, “beyond the reaches of science”.
But this can only be the
case if demonstrations are purely scientific in nature. Anybody who has
read my opening essay knows that I’ve already gave answers against objections
like this, which seems to me to presuppose scientism. I’ve given reasons why
scientism is absurd and self-defeating. So, unless Mar gives good reasons for
believing in scientism, his objections are – to borrow a word from him –
futile.
Anyhow, he acknowledges
that I indeed have insisted that when it comes to arguing about God’s
existence, one ought to enter into the philosophical arena, for the question of
God’s existence is no longer a scientific issue. But he also said that even “in
the face of philosophical scrutiny”, the attributes of God that I attributed to
the First Cause doesn’t stand a chance. But we have already seen his reasons
for why he would believe this. And as we have seen, they are the ones that
can’t stand a chance in the face of philosophical scrutiny, for it rests on
failure to distinguish a lot of things, misunderstandings, and confusions.
Appeal to Tradition: A
big no-no?
Mar, in many parts of his
opening essay, has praised my style of argumentation – or at least the initial
stages of my argumentation (and I appreciate it, sir Mar; I could say the same
thing to you, I believe). When it comes to solving the gap problem, that’s
where he “lost it”. One of his objections is even if I have started my argument
correctly, I suddenly became inconsistent when it comes to my way of proving
the Divinity of the First Cause. Why so? Mar says that it is because, suddenly,
I appealed to tradition, and this is proven in my statements such as when I
said that the attributes of the First Cause are “traditionally classified
as divine attributes”.
There’s no nice way of
saying it: this objection is just bad. Really bad. This is an obvious example
of the genetic fallacy. Mar objected to my conclusion that the First Cause must
be God solely because of the fact that my source is the
traditional/classical theist school of thought. To see the error of Mar’s
objection: imagine if an atheist gives reasons for disbelieving in Christianity
by appealing to reasons against Christian belief raised by people like, say,
Nietzsche and Sartre. Imagine, further, that a Christian objected to the
atheist’s reasons simply by saying that the atheist cannot appeal to
“objections that are traditionally classified as objections against
Christianity” because that is contrary to valid and sound argumentation. Did
the Christian effectively refute the reasons raised by the atheist? Not at all.
The atheist can rightly say, “yeah, but just because I appealed to traditional
objections against Christianity doesn’t imply that those objections are false”.
I can say the same thing to Mar: just because I appealed to the traditional
theist school of thought doesn’t mean the reasoning I used on the basis of that
school of thought is automatically false.” Mar has to give reasons why
reasoning on that basis is false. So far, he hasn’t given any.
Theology: The Science of
Dodging?
Afterwards, Mar says we
cannot really investigate what the first cause is really God or not because
“mere mortals cannot and will not leave this material world in order to
investigate the immaterial, supernatural world”. But again, this can only be
true if the only legitimate form of investigation is scientific investigation.
We already saw why this cannot be the case. I gave a metaphysical demonstration
that has concluded in the existence of God. Until Mar engages himself into the
metaphysical discussion, he will continue missing the point.
And because we cannot
investigate whether or not the First Cause is God, for Mar, this has allowed
theologians to just modify their conception of God every time there is an
atheist counter-argument. He cites the omnipotence paradox as an example. The
answer to the omnipotence paradox that theologians have raised modified the
word “omnipotent”, altering its original meaning from being “all powerful” to
just “maximally powerful as logic allows”.
I don’t know about Mar,
but for me, I see no problem with modifying our beliefs if it entails
incoherence. Would Mar suddenly abandon his atheism just because we can
formulate a theist counter-argument? I highly doubt that that will be the case.
It’s more likely that he will just re-assess his views and see whether or not
the counter-argument really works. If it does, that doesn’t really disprove
atheism simpliciter, at least for him. What the counter-argument really
shows is that there is something wrong with his own brand of atheism, not
with atheism as such.
We can say the same thing
concerning counter-arguments against theism such as the omnipotence paradox. If
it is correct, the omnipotence paradox doesn’t show that theism is false per
se, it would only show that a brand of theism, namely, the brand of theism
that conceives of God as someone who can do everything, including logically
contradictory actions, is false.
Anyhow, we have no reason
to think that the omnipotence paradox is correct. If the First Cause is Esse
Tantum/pure Being itself, then whatever is impossible in being/impossible
to be actualized cannot be caused to exist by the First Cause, because
impossible things, like logically contradictory ones, cannot have the
possibility of being actualized. What is possible is grounded on the
actual, and if a logically contradictory thing cannot be actualized, then it is
impossible.
Mar also writes “(a)n
objective standard cannot possibly be set if your supernatural subject cannot
be investigated objectively - via natural means.” If by “natural means” he
means “only scientific means” then he’s right because, once again, God’s
existence isn’t a scientific issue. But if he means “any means by which we can
investigate reality, whether philosophical or scientific” then he’s dead wrong.
Metaphysical demonstrations are grounded in a valid philosophical means in
investigating reality. Mar has given no reason for us to think otherwise.
He ends the fifth section
of his opening essay in this way:
In short, all theories concerning the characteristics and nature
of God are ultimately contingent on human speculation and opinion - UNLESS this
God manifests in the physical realm in order to be verified by the human beings
he claims to love. An omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent deity
surely is capable, has the knowledge, has the capacity, and by default,
powerful enough to reside and manifest BOTH in the immaterial and material
world. But alas, all we have are flawed attributions to God made by various
theologians that most people cannot even agree on - hence the fragmented and
interpretative nature of religion.
The first thing to point out here is: what exactly is the kind
of “manifestation” that God should make in order to count as real evidence or
proof for His existence? As a Thomist, I would argue that God need not do this,
because He has manifested Himself enough already: all the motion,
efficient causality, teleology, and the like in the world can be traced back
to God as their primary cause and final end. As I’ve argued, causal
finitism itself points to the Divine First Cause. If by “manifestation” Mar
means “God has to show His face in the sky and say ‘I am God’”, then Mar is
once again thinking that scientific/empirical manifestation is the only valid
form of manifestation. This is a false assumption, as we have seen.
He pointed out that because of lack of manifestation from God,
all religion has is a “fragmented and interpretative nature”. This is
completely unrelated to the issue we are debating about. Even if religion is
flawed in its nature, this won’t show theism itself is false and atheism is
true. It will only show that we should adhere to a form of irreligion or
another. But philosophical theism is still an option, if that’s the case.
IV.
Conclusion
In the concluding part of his essay, Mar just reiterated his
point that “the logical reasoning that attempts to deify (the First Cause) has
some inconsistencies”. We have seen that his attempts to salvage this claim
fail. He also gave examples of scenarios that, at least for him, appear
inconsistent and incompatible with God’s existence, such as the reality of evil
and Divine Hiddenness (whatever this means; in my view, God is never hidden,
given that He, as the sustaining cause of created reality, is always immanently
present in reality as a cause). He didn’t expound on such problems for theism
so I won’t either. All I can say for now is this: if there are really good,
solid proofs for God’s existence that really show that He indeed exists (such
as the version of the Kalam I am defending), then these problems are only apparent
problems that have solutions. After showing the God indeed exists, then the
theologian or philosopher can develop a theodicy afterwards.
He ended his conclusion by telling the parable of the Invisible
Gardener. It’s a great parable, I’d admit. It really shows that there is
something wrong with the position of the explorer who believes that there might
indeed be an invisible gardener. My only comment about that is this: it is
indeed absurd to believe that there is indeed an invisible gardener, because
we know what a gardener is. Gardeners cannot be invisible at all. In this
written debate, that is precisely the issue: what is the nature of the
“gardener” who has cultivated the soil of existence? I have demonstrated that
it is indeed a Divine “gardener”. Mar has, so far at least, failed to give us
reasons to think I’m wrong.
To conclude this essay, allow me quote a passage from The
Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 286:
Human intelligence is surely already capable of
finding a response to the question of origins. The existence of God the
Creator can be known with certainty through his works, by the light of human
reason.
It is my hope and prayer that Mar, by the end
of this discussion, acknowledge this fact and recognize the existence of His
Creator who lovingly and mercifully sustains Him in Being; a Creator who is not
just a worthy topic for discussion, but also and most importantly a Creator who
is absolutely worthy of our worship and love.
St. Thomas Aquinas,
Pray for Us
I dedicate this essay
to my mother, Mylen D. Antero, who passed away due to breast cancer just a few
weeks ago by the time I am writing this. I love you, mommy. May you rest in the
Lord’s peace.
Endnotes:
[i]
Agnostic philosopher Joe Schmid seems to have the same definition of what a
part is. See Schmid, A Plethora of Prima Facie Problems for Classical Theism
https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2020/03/14/a-plethora-of-prima-facie-problems-for-classical-theism/
[ii] Granger,
Herebert (1980) Aristotle and the Genus-Species relation https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1980.tb01362.x
[iii]
Thomas Aquinas (1997), De Ente et Essentia (Translated by Robert T.
Miller). This argument is one of my personal favorites. In fact, it is an
argument that, in my view at least, is stronger than the argument I am
originally defending in this written debate. For a contemporary defense of the
argument, see Kerr, Gaven (2015), Aquinas’s way to God: The Proof in De Ente
et Essentia
[iv] Aquinas,
De Ente, Cap. 4: “Whatever is not in the concept of
the essence or the quiddity comes from beyond the essence and makes a
composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the
things that are its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood
without understanding anything about its existence (emphasis mine): I can
understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless not know whether
either has existence in reality. Therefore, it is clear that existence is
something other than the essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is something
whose quiddity is its very own existence, and this thing must be one and
primary.”
[v]
Ibid.
[vi]
This is upon the suggestion of my friend and fellow Aquinas enthusiast, Lheanne
Jude Salvacion
[vii]
For a extended explanation, see Feser, Edward (2014), Scholastic
Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction
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