DOES GOD EXIST? Matt vs Mar (Written Debate) Matt's opening statement

THE NEW KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT[i]

ML Antero

(Opening Remarks for Written Debate)

I.                 On William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument

Before I proceed in making my case for what I would call “the new Kalam Cosmological Argument”, I would like first to thank “Mar”, one of the admins of the Facebook page Atheism in the Philippines, for agreeing to participate in this written debate. As rational animals, to be able to think about philosophical topics such as the one we’re doing in this debate is one unique ability of man. I appreciate the fact that he is gracious enough to agree to exercise with me this majestic ability through discussing the existence of God. One of the hardest things to do today, due to the “Snowflake” and “Cancel” culture, is to have an intelligent discussion between peoples while setting aside each of their biases and feelings and properly assessing the arguments of the other side. Hopefully, both I and “Mar” would be able to pull off such a much-needed conversation.

I felt it appropriate that, before I give a defense of my preferred version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I should say something about the traditional version commonly defended by many apologists first. This is because I just want to make it absolutely clear that in case you have a problem with the Kalam, that probably means that you only have a problem with a specific version of the Kalam, not exactly with all the ways the argument can be made. I also wanted to make a clear distinction between the argument I’ll be defending and the traditional Kalam.

          I am not a fan of the Kalam in the way it is traditionally formulated. I am referring to the variation championed by Christian apologists such as William Lane Craig[ii]. The argument is commonly presented in the following syllogism:

 

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause

(2) The universe began to exist

(3) Therefore, the universe had a cause

 

We can proceed from the syllogism to the reasoning that since God is the best (or might even be the only possible) explanation for the cause of the universe, then God exists. I have no problem with (1), and neither do almost all people[iii]. So, many who would object to the argument will express their disagreement with regards to (2). Objecting to (2) can be done in many ways: one can deny the certainty of the premise and say that we are not sure/there’s not enough evidence that the universe began to exist, or one might even take the route of radical skepticism and say we are not even sure if there’s such thing as a “universe”. On my part, I have at least 2 reasons why I am skeptical of the argument. What follows will just be a summary of my position.

First, I am not convinced with the scientific evidence that Craig uses to defend (2), and I can break this reason down into two sub-reasons. The first one is this: he will commonly appeal to scientific findings from big bang cosmology or the second law of thermodynamics. Even if we grant that those findings are true, those findings cannot prove that the start of created reality is identical to the start of our universe. Who knows? Maybe there was a created reality before the big bang. May be there was a universe prior to our universe, or even a bunch of multiverses that existed prior to ours. There are no evidences for such speculations, that’s for sure. But there are also no evidences against them.

The second sub-reason for my first reason is that many scientific conclusions today may be disproven in the future, even if those conclusions may be obvious for us right now. Take, for example, the Newtonian absolutist view of space-time. It was widely accepted for hundreds of years, and it just seems too obvious to be false, and there seems to be no way to refute such a view. But what happened? Einstein happened!

This entails that we are not in the position to say that the evidence from science that Craig uses to defend (2) will not be susceptible to change due to future scientific findings. We just cannot know that. This reason is also why I am not a fan of arguments for God’s existence that appeal to natural science, whether it aims to prove that the past has a beginning or not[iv]

My second reason is with regards to Craig’s philosophical argument for a finite past. It can be formulated this way:

         

(1) If the past is infinite, then we would have to traverse an actually infinite number of days in order to go into the present day, which means we cannot go to the present day

(2) We are in the present day

(3) Therefore, the past is not infinite

 

He would also use paradoxes such as the Hilbert’s Hotel paradox to reason that if actual infinites cannot exist in the real world, then the universe cannot have an infinite history and thus there cannot be an infinite number of past events[v].

The problem is that it seems to me that Craig confuses potential infinites from actual infinites.[vi] This problem has an even stronger force against Craig’s Kalam if we consider that Craig himself is a presentist, or someone who believes that when it comes to time, only the present exist, with the past no longer existing and the future not yet existing. This would entail a problem with Craig’s overall philosophical position: for him, the past, if ever it is infinite, is not an actual infinite, since the present is all there is; but this means that he cannot use his philosophical argument for the finitude of the past, which relies on a definition of the past as an actuality, since it will defeat his presentist view. “If the present alone is real, then how can an infinite series of events in time count as an actual infinite?  Past moments of time are not actual; they no longer exist… Hence there really is even prima facie (again, if one is a presentist) no such thing as an infinite collection of past moments of time.”[vii] So, Craig’s Kalam can be refuted, it seems, by appealing to Craig’s very own philosophical view on time.

So, I think there are problems with the traditional/Craig-style form of arguing from the impossibility of an infinite past to a Divine first cause. So, the question now for all of us is: is there any way for the Kalam to be vindicated? Can we reformulate it into something stronger, something that is immune to possible changes in scientific findings and other difficulties?

 

II.             The Kalam argument: from Causal Finitism to God

I propose that the answer to the questions above is yes. The argument I will be defending is a variation of the Kalam based on the formulation by philosophers Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons[viii]. My step-by-step break down of the argument runs thus:

(1) There is causation

(2) Causation cannot be circular

(3) Causation cannot stretch infinitely backwards

(4) If causation cannot be circular/stretch infinitely, then there is at least one first cause

(5) The first cause(s)’s existence either has to be (necessary) or need not be (contingent)

(6) The first cause(s) cannot be contingent

(7) Therefore, the first cause(s) is necessary

(8) For a necessary being to exist is for God to exist

(9) Therefore, God exists

 

I would like to point out a couple of points about some of the steps. First, both the theist and the atheist can accept (4), or that there is at least one first cause. The dispute would seem to be with regards to the nature of this first cause(s). So, if that’s the case, then I would say that the real clash between the theist and the atheist will be on (5) – (9). Second, it should be clear now that the aim of this argument is not to prove the existence of a specific god(s) of a specific religion/belief system. I even allowed, at least for (5) – (7), that there may be multiple first causes, despite my adherence to a monotheistic religion. So, to object that this argument doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian/Muslim/Jewish God is beside the point and won’t affect the argument. Surely, I will be arguing that this first cause must only be one and not many later on, but the point still stands. If this argument is correct, it will only lead us, at most, to a kind of Philosophical Theism, and not to a specific religious view/church.

The first two steps would be, I think, something acceptable to most, if not all, people, so I won’t spend so much time in diving to the issue of whether or not there is causation/circularity in causation. After all, we do indeed find causation in the world. Humans, trees, cars, dogs, etc. have causes. To deny causation also brings us to a radical skepticism about perception. If we deny causation, then we cannot say that whatever we perceive is caused by the state of affairs in the external world. We also know that one cannot cause itself (this would mean that the thing should exist before it exists, which is impossible), or cause its cause (this would mean that the thing would be both ontologically prior and posterior to itself and to its cause, which is impossible), for that would be two instances of a thing “pulling its own metaphysical bootstraps”, as it were.

But, just like Craig’s variation, (3) seems to be the most controversial in all the steps. This might also seem to prove that my position is a hypocritical one. After all, won’t my criticisms to Craig’s second premise apply to my (3)?

That’s an understandable concern of an objector. But the concern is nonetheless still answerable: my (3) will only be at the same ideological level to Craig’s (2) if and only if I will rely on the same scientific/philosophical supports that Craig uses. That is exactly what I won’t do.

Instead, I would be arguing for what Alexander Pruss calls Causal Finitism, or the position that claims a thing can, at most, have finitely many causes only.[ix]

 

III.         Lamps, Grim Reapers, and anything in between

I think it would be fun to start this section through two paradoxes. I will use the first paradox only to get you thinking. My whole argument, however, has a special partnership, you might say, with the second one.

The first paradox is called the Thomson’s Lamp paradox, named after British Philosopher James Thomson, who formulated the original version of the paradox[x]. The paradox asks us to imagine a lamp that is able to accomplish what philosophers call a supertask, or the ability to accomplish an infinite number of tasks in a finite amount of time.

So, according to the Paradox, we have a lamp that toggles from on to off (and vice versa) when the switch is pushed. Since this lamp is able to do a supertask, it can go from on to off (and on again, and so on…) in a finite amount of time, say, from 10 pm to 11 pm. Let’s say that by 10:00, the lamp is on, then by 10:30, as you push the switch, the lamp is off. 10:45 comes, and the lamp goes on again, after you pushed the switch, then by 10:50:02.5, you turn it off once more, and so on ad infinitum as you keep on dividing between the current time and 11:00 and as you keep on pushing the button at these halfway points. This entails that by 11 pm comes, the lamp switched from being on to being off for an infinite number of times already.

The question is this: by the time 11 pm comes, is the lamp on or off? It seems that the Thomson’s lamp scenario is so bizarre and impossible that there seems to be no possible answer for such a question. But, once again, the paradox above is just a warm up for things to come, so that you may intellectually anticipate the next parts of this essay. “Intellectually anticipate what, specifically?”, you may ask. The answer is this: to anticipate the fact that, when paired, causation and infinity can have strange conclusions. In fact, more than strange, as we will see later on.

The second paradox that I’ll be presenting here is what is called the Grim Reaper paradox. This paradox was originally formulated by mathematician Jose Bernardete[xi]. I will give two versions of this paradox: first, I will give a paradox that retains the core scenario of Bernardete’s version; the second paradox follows the “structure” of the original paradox but is more realistic. I call this paradox the book club paradox.

The first paradox goes like this: an infinite number of grim reapers (to be referred to as GRs from here on out, GR if only referring to a single grim reaper) has sentenced Fred to death. Each GR has a scythe and an alarm clock. As soon as the appointed time comes (signaled by the alarm from the alarm clock), a particular GR n assigned in that particular time t checks whether Fred is still alive. If Fred is still alive at t, the GR n kills Fred by decapitation. But if Fred is already dead, then the GR n does nothing to Fred. An additional condition for this paradox is that no GR can fail to do his task.

So, this is the schedule for each GR: GR 1 will kill Fred (WKF) at 11:00 pm, GR 2 WKF at 10:45 pm, GR 3 WKF at 10: 30 pm, GR 4 WKF at 10:25:05 pm, and so on ad infinitum…

It is important to understand that there is no first GR. The first GR in this scenario is the last GR. The initial question is: by 11 pm, is Fred still alive? Will he survive this whole scenario?

The obvious answer is no, Fred won’t survive this scenario. He’ll surely die. I mean, who would survive when an infinite number of GRs are there to kill you? If Fred is still alive by time t, then if a GR n is assigned to kill him at t, then n will surely kill him. Anyhow, we know that he’s no longer alive at t, since GR n+1 already checked Fred, and killed him before t (if he’s still alive before t) and again, no GR will fail in his task.

But here’s another question: which GR kills Fred? Can it be GR 1, who is assigned at 11:00 pm? We know that before him, GR 2 already checked on Fred at 10:45 pm, and so Fred is already either dead by 11:00 pm or a prior GR before GR 2 has already killed Fred. We can do this on and on ad infinitum, and not be able settle on a specific GR. This means that no GR is able to kill Fred, for before each GR, there was already a prior GR who killed Fred already.

The conclusion for this scenario then is that, by 11:00 pm, Fred is both dead and alive! But being both dead and alive at the same time violates the logical principle of non-contradiction, which says that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, in the same respect. This means that the GR paradox is impossible, because logical contradictions are impossible.

I would argue below that such a scenario is impossible and concludes in a logical contradiction because an event (or state) cannot have an infinite causal history, and thus causal finitism is true. Because, if we only posit a finite number of GRs, then the problem of the impossibility of identifying the Gr who killed Fred will be solved. But before we go there, I would like to modify the GR paradox, because an objector might say “why not say instead that the reason why the GR paradox is impossible is because GRs are not real?” This, I think, is just a trivial point and won’t really affect the claim that causal finitism is true. But I have no problem granting that. Let’s create, then, a modified, more realistic version of the GR paradox, which I will call the book club paradox.

The paradox goes like this: there’s an annual tradition in a book club where a club member P will pass a book B to his successor P+1 after a year, a book which P received from his predecessor who possessed the book for a year as well. B has to have a signature written on its front page. If a prior B possessor already has written his signature, then his successors have to do nothing except to maintain the status quo. All the members of this series cannot fail to do their duty.

So far, so good. But let’s say that P has an infinite number of predecessors who possessed B before him (which implies that there are an infinite number of years before P possessed B). The same duty applies to them: B has to have a signature written on the front page. If a prior B possessor already has written his signature, then his successors have to do nothing except to maintain the status quo. Once again, all the members of this series cannot fail to do their duty.

Let’s also suppose that P’s successor, P+1, is the last member of this series and that he will receive the book this year (because the book club, after existing for infinity past is finally disbanding this year, for whatever reasons). By the time P+1 has the book, finally, will B have a signature of one of its past possessors in its front page? Once more, like the GR paradox, it seems that by this year, B has to have a signature by one past possessor, because after all, there are an infinite number of former possessors, so B cannot fail to have a signature. But the issue is which past possessor has put his signature on B? Just like the GR paradox, it is impossible to point to a specific past possessor. For if we say that a specific past possessor SPP n is the one who put his signature on B, we can point to a prior possessor SPP n+1 who, again, cannot fail to do his duty. The same problem applies to SPP n+2, n+3, n+4, n+5, and so on ad infinitum.

So, even in this more realistic version of the GR paradox, we still have a logically contradictory conclusion: by this year, B will have a signature on its front page because no past possessor can fail to do his duty, but at the same time, B will have no signature on its front page, because there can be no specific past possessor that will be able to put his signature. Since scenarios like this are impossible given the laws of logic, causal finitism must be true. The way to solve this paradox is to posit just a finite number of past possessors, just like our solution to the GR paradox.

An objector might say that I am guilty of non sequitur fallacy. Just because scenarios like the GR and book club paradox are instances of series of events that cannot have an infinite causal history, that doesn’t mean that all other events cannot have an infinite causal history. So, it doesn’t follow from these paradoxes that some scenarios in the real world, or the whole universe(s) itself (themselves) cannot have an infinite causal history.

Let’s answer this objection. But in order to do so, allow me to present further arguments for causal finitism, and for (3) of my argument, for that matter.

 

IV.          2 Arguments for Causal Finitism

I have 2 arguments in support of the premise that says “causation cannot stretch infinitely” and for causal finitism, the principle that supports the premise. The first argument is called the argument from the patchwork principle. The second is called the argument to the best explanation.

The argument from the patchwork principle in support of (3) goes like this:

(10)         If causal finitism is false, then the GR/book club paradox is possible, given the patchwork principle for constructing possible worlds

(11)         The GR/book club paradox is not possible

(12)         Therefore, causal finitism is not false (or, causal finitism is true)

What is the patchwork principle? It is a principle formulated by the atheist philosopher David Lewis that guides us to formulate or make judgments about what is metaphysically possible[xii]. It is worth noting too, before we break down the principle, the fact that the argument appeals to a principle formulated by an atheist, and so the defender of the argument cannot be accused of merely appealing to principles exclusively used by theists.

So, how does the patchwork principle go? What is its standard(s) in identifying what can be considered a possible world?

The key word here is patchwork. A patchwork is a form of needlework that sews together different fabrics to create a bigger/more colorful design. In order to create a patchwork, you need two things: the patches and the framework that you will use as a “room” to put your patches on. To use the patchwork principle in determining possible worlds is to use the steps in making patchworks analogously.

The patchwork principle assumes two things in order to yield a conclusion: (1) that a particular situation S is contained in a possible world w1, and (2) a w2 with a spatio-temporal framework that provides enough “room” for S to be repeated for n times. (1) is our “patch”, (2) is our “framework”. Once we combine (1) and (2), we will now have a complete “patchwork (3): a w3 where a situation identical to S has been repeated n times, according to w2’s structure.

Consider this particular example. Let’s say that Fred dribbles a ball once every five seconds. That would make Fred dribble the ball 12 times per minute. That scenario will be our (1). Our (2) would be a 60 minute/1-hour timeframe. This means that we have (3): a possible world where Fred dribbles the basketball for 43,200 times.

     If causal finitism is false (or at least possibly false), then we can create a w2 where an event, thing, or state of affairs has an infinite causal history. What can stop us from combining this w2 from a w1 where there’s a scenario such as “there’s an annual tradition in a book club where a club member P will pass a book B to his successor P+1 after a year, a book which P received from his predecessor who possessed the book for a year as well. B has to have a signature written on the front page. If a prior B possessor already has written his signature, then his successors have to do nothing except to maintain the status quo. All the members of this series cannot fail to do their duty”? Furthermore, what can stop us from creating a w3 where there’s an infinite number of past possessors?

The objector might ask: Why rely on the patchwork principle in formulating possible worlds? Because this principle is what we use in everyday life, especially when we consider whether a scenario that hasn’t happened yet can happen in the future. When a boss tells his worker, for example, to do a specific activity, it is important to know when the deadline is. We can thus arrange and schedule our duties so that such an activity can be finished before the deadline. In this particular example, w1 would be our making the activity, while w2 will be the timeframe for the accomplishment of the activity.

The patchwork principle is also reliable because we have the real world as its foundation. Through the principle, we cannot be accused of wishful thinking, or formulating the impossible, because we are not just creating imaginary worlds out of thin air, you might say. The principle allows us to look at the actual status quo and, from that, judge what is possible from what’s not.

Thus, the argument for causal finitism stands by way of reductio ad absurdum. If causal finitism is false, then there’s nothing stopping us to create scenarios such as the one presented in the book club paradox. But we know that the book club paradox entails a logical contradiction, and so it is impossible. If the said paradox is impossible, then causal finitism must be true. And so, we can answer the charge of non sequitur fallacy presented above. If we say that all (or at least some) real-world events can possibly have infinite causal histories, then there’s nothing stopping us from entertaining the possibility of a logically absurd scenario.

The second argument, called the argument to the best explanation, goes like this:

(13)         If something/a scenario can be explained by many explanations, the best explanation is most probably true

(14)         Causal finitism is the best explanation (supposing that there may be other explanations) when it comes to scenarios such as the GR/book club paradox

(15)         Therefore, causal finitism is most probably true

 

Let’s grant, then, that there may be other alternatives to causal finitism. But why choose them over causal finitism? Once we have causal finitism as a starting principle, we no longer need to worry about potential problems that can arise from the other alternatives. To use the Thomson’s lamp scenario again, all we have to say is that there can be no such thing as a lamp that can perform a supertask like toggling infinitely from on to off from 10 pm to 11 pm. Once we say that, we have thereby avoided any bizzare, or even impossible, consequences.

 But this argument isn’t as weak or simple as some might suppose. In support of such an argument, Pruss uses what he calls an infinite fair lottery scenario[xiii].. But I believe there’s an even simpler scenario that we can use, a scenario which, in fact, Pruss also uses[xiv] (once again, I will try my best to modify this a little bit, for the non-philosopher to grasp easily).

Suppose we have an infinite deck of cards, with no last card (so, it’s a kind of “bottomless” deck) and that a certain person, X, has an infinite number of days in the past to be able to shuffle it. Suppose also that, 2 days ago, X shuffled the first 2 cards on the deck. Then, 3 days ago, X shuffled the first 3 cards; 4 days ago, the first 4 cards, and so on ad infinitum. So, this means that the cards have been shuffled perfectly by X.

Let’s say that X offers you and I a game: you and I will pull cards off the top of the deck. The one with the card with a bigger number written on it wins. The loser pays the winner 10 dollars. This seems a fair game, considering that the cards have been fully shuffled.

But, even if the cards have been fully shuffled, it seems reasonable to think, on your part, that you will most likely lose the game. For whatever card you pick, there’s only a finite number of cards with a lesser number and an infinite number of cards with a greater number than your card’s. For instance, if you pick the card with the number 103 on it, there are only 102 cards with smaller numbers and an infinite number of cards with greater numbers. No matter card you get, the number written on it is small compared to the total quantity of cards. It seems, then, that if only it is possible, it would be better if you switch cards with me in order to win the game.

However, the same concern affects me as well. I know that it is more likely that I will lose the game too, because I am at the same situation as yours. Whatever card I pick, the cards with lower numbers than my card is always finitely lower in quantity while the cards with higher numbers that my card is always infinitely greater in quantity. Just like your situation, it is reasonable that I switch cards with you, to increase my chances of winning.

But even if we play this game and switch cards for how many times we like, we will always be confronted with the same problem. This apparently “fair” game (since the whole deck was completely shuffled anyway) will always be unfair to any participant of the game. Any participant will most likely lose. To expect that an opponent will win will always be a rational expectation.

But what if we presuppose causal finitism? What if we say that it is impossible for X to have a causal framework that can allow him to cause the infinite deck to be completely shuffled? Then our problems will be solved. All we have to say, for instance, is that X only has the space and time to shuffle a finite number of cards only. We can now really say that we can play a fair game by picking only that finite number of cards that was shuffled. For instance, if X only had the time to shuffle the first 10 cards on the top of the deck, then we can use those 10 cards only and have a fair chance of winning against our opponents. Furthermore, the problem completely vanishes if we only have a finite number of cards in the deck as a whole.

The scenario we just considered points to the fact that by presupposing causal finitism, we not only reject the alternative(s), but we are also able avoid the potential problems that can arise from any alternative. Causal finitism best explains any instance where causation is involved. If that’s the case, then why choose any solution other than causal finitism? After all, science also infers to the best explanation from time to time. So, anybody who trusts the scientific method has no good reason to deny causal finitism and settle for other principles contrary to it (if ever there are other principles).

Non-theist philosopher Graham Oppy responds to a similar paradox to what we’ve considered above. Instead of having an infinite number of GRs, he responds to a scenario involving an infinite number of bells, with each bell giving out a deafening sound once its time comes for it to ring[xv]. The scenario ends, just like in the GR/book club paradox, in a paradoxical way: you cannot retain your hearing by the time the last bell rings, and yet you will retain your hearing because no specific bell will be able to ring. Oppy’s response is that your deafness is not a result of a specific bell giving out a specific sound, but rather the result of the collective sounds of all the bells. So, the objector to my argument might say the same thing. Why don’t we say instead that Fred will die by the end of the GR scenario because of all the GRs, not just because of a specific GR?

This response misses the point, because the GR scenario says that Fred is dead and stays dead once an individual GR kills Fred. The book club scenario also says that the other possessors of the book will no longer put their signature once one of their predecessors already put a signature in the B’s front page. The ending of all scenarios depends on the individuals, not on the general members of the sets we’ve considered. So, answering by appealing to the collective is out of the discussion.

To be sure, one can object by saying that the argument presupposes that things (or at least some) should have explanations and that I didn’t give an argument to support such a presupposition. I promise to answer this objection below when I introduce another principle needed to support the version of the Kalam I am defending.

But before we go there, it is important to clarify some potential misunderstandings. Causal finitism doesn’t entail the impossibility of other forms of actual infinites. This is another difference with Craig’s position that I would like to emphasize. Craig’s finitism implies that every actual infinite is impossible[xvi]. Causal finitism does not go that far. Causal finitism, for example, does not mean that mathematical infinites are impossible. Mathematical entities are about abstractions, not causation.

Causal finitism also does not mean that effectual infinitism is impossible. That a single thing, event or state of affairs cannot have an infinite number of causes connected to each other doesn’t imply that a state of affairs cannot have an infinite number of effects. Causal finitism just says that something can, at most, have finitely many causes only. That is all.

 

V.               First Cause: Now What?

From (1) – (3), (4) necessarily follows. If causation cannot be circular and cannot, given causal finitism, be infinitely backwards, then there is at least one first cause. Notice that I am still allowing, at this point in the argument, the possibility of multiple first causes. Not only that, these first causes might not even fit the description one uses for God. Even Pruss himself notes that “God is not the only candidate for an uncaused cause” and “one might think that there are uncaused random quantum fluctuations all around us, none of which is God”[xvii]. To repeat what I’ve said above, (4) can be accepted whether or not one’s a Theist. Further argumentation is needed to establish that the first cause is God. Once again, the real issue for both sides are (5) – (9). It is in these stages of the argument that I want to focus now.

The first question we have to ask, then, in order to establish whether this first cause is God or not is: what is the nature of this first cause(s)? Specifically, is (are) the(se) first cause(s) necessary or contingent?

Let’s define our terms. What do I mean by “necessary”? What do I mean by “contingent”? I will specifically use these terms in describing the existential status of the first cause(s). By “necessary” I just mean “that which has to exist” or ‘that which cannot fail to exist”. By “contingent” I mean exactly the opposite: that which need not exist, or can fail to exist. So, when we ask “Is the first cause(s) necessary or contingent?”, I mean “does the first cause have to exist or not?”

Suppose that the first cause(s) is (are) contingent, or that it (they) need not exist, and that they can not exist. That gives us a further problem: why do they exist, if they need not exist?

The only plausible answer is that if the first cause(s) are contingent, then they require a cause or explanation outside themselves in order to be. But since it is the first cause(s), they do not have causes/explanations outside themselves (and neither can they cause themselves, since causation cannot be circular) as to why they exist. Therefore, the first cause(s) cannot be contingent. So, the first cause(s) must be necessary, and has to exist.

This argument rests on what is known as the principle of sufficient reason (to be referred to as PSR from here on out). There are many variations of the PSR, but for the sake of the argument I’m defending, I’ll just use the variation that says everything contingent must have an explanation for why it exists[xviii].

Why should we accept the PSR? There are three good reasons[xix]. First, we can use inductive generalization. We indeed explanations most of the time when we look for them. And even if we don’t find them, we don’t say that there is no explanation at all. It’s just that we don’t have enough backing evidence/proof that we can have access to in order to yield a conclusion for whatever it is that we are investigating about. When a murder remains unsolved, it is unacceptable for any detective to say “well, don’t worry about it; that murder happened for no reason at all”.

Second, denying PSR would entail a radical skepticism about our perceptions. After all, if PSR is false, there might be no explanation at all as to why we sense what we sense. We might just be hallucinating, or dreaming. Who are we to say that we’re not? Yes, our perceptions might still be caused by the external world. But without PSR, we cannot say that this is more likely than the other alternatives.

But what if we really cannot trust our senses? The PSR, though, can be pushed further than any possible skepticism. Because if there is no PSR, who are we to say that our beliefs are backed by good reasons to believe them? More than that, who are we to say that our reasoning skills are backed by the laws of logic? If PSR is false, then probably our beliefs have no proper explanations. Maybe our beliefs just “popped out of nowhere” due to our “brain states” (if you want to be a materialist, I’ll bite the bullet) which, in turn, may be just purely random. Maybe our reasoning is already illogical. To be more specific, the one denying PSR may have no reasonable grounding for denying PSR. Ultimately, then, any denial of PSR will be self-defeating.

So, allow me to go back to the objection presented before the section of this essay: “Why should we suppose that the argument to the best explanation for causal finitism, for instance, works? What if there are no explanations?” Because of the PSR. Denying it reduces one’s own beliefs to potential absurdity and unreasonableness. In fact, denying PSR entails we might not have any reasonable explanation as to why it is reasonable to ask “what if there are no explanations?”. PSR-denial will ultimately eat itself. Another response we can make is “What do you mean that there might be no explanations? I just gave an explanation!” For the objector’s skepticism to be justified, he has to answer every single explanation we gave above.

So, for any reasonable conversation and investigation/inference to happen, we always have to presuppose the PSR. This no less applies to investigating the nature of the first cause(s).

Why should we conclude that contingent things have to have explanations for their existence outside themselves? Because that is the nature of contingency. Once again, to be contingent means that one need not, or could fail to, exist. In other words, there is no innate reason for any contingent thing to be. And if that’s the case, then we have to look for reasons external to any contingent thing to know why a contingent thing exists.

Notice also that this principle applies even to contingent things that were already existing for all eternity. A contingent thing need not begin to exist. Even if the sun is eternally existing, the light and heat coming from it which eternally exists also is still contingent upon the sun. “Contingent” is not identical to “began to be”.

Any contingent thing, then, cannot be a candidate for being the first cause. Because to say that the explanation for one’s existence is external is just another way to say that one’s existence had/has a cause (again, regardless of whether or not the contingent thing began to exist or not). What can we get from this? To be a first cause is to be necessary. To be a first cause entails that it is something that cannot fail to exist. Otherwise we have a contingent first cause, which basically means “a caused first cause” which is a contradiction in terms.

To use a philosophically deeper and a more precise language used in Thomistic schools of thought: the difference between a contingent and a necessary thing is that a contingent thing has its existence (that it is) distinct from its essence (what it is), while a necessary thing, which is what the first cause(s) is, has its existence as either its very essence or at least a part of its essence[xx].

But which is it? Is the first cause’s existence its very essence or just a part of it?

What is it for a thing to have parts, whether physical or metaphysical? I think we all can agree that in order for parts to turn into a single whole, it has to be arranged into a whole. In other words, it has to be caused to form a whole. Again, whether or not the thing with parts has been eternally existing is beside the point. Even if a chair has been existing in eternity past, it is only a chair because its parts are arranged to form a single chair.

But the first cause(s) doesn’t have a cause. This entails that the first cause(s) cannot have parts, both physical and metaphysical. This means that the first cause(s) is (are) absolutely simple[xxi].

And if it (they) is (are) absolutely simple, then the first cause(s)’s existence is not just a part of its (their) essence. The first cause(s)’s existence is its very essence. This means that the first cause(s) is (are), to use another Thomistic jargon, what is (are) called Ipsum Esse Subsistens, or Subsistent Being Itself (Themselves).

And so, we come to another important question: should we call it a “first cause” or should we call them “first causes”? Is there only one or more than one first cause?

How can we know the answer to such a question? In order to say that there are multiple things contained in a single genus, we have to find differentiating principles in all the things in that genus. For example, we are able to say that there are multiple things contained in the genus “human” because there are different humans, and we know that there are different humans because there are different things about distinct humans. Human X is different from human Y because X has a different skin color, say, or brain wiring, or occupation, or home address, etc. from Y. Only if we find differentiating principles in things forming a single genus can we say that there are multiple things in that genus.

So, in order to know whether there are multiple first causes or not, we have to treat “Ipsum Esse Subsistens” as the genus, since that is what’s common to them, and see if there are differentiating principles between those contained in the genus.

In other words, everything that is Ipsum Esse Subsistens must be Ipsum Esse Subsistens plus a differentiating principle. But if that’s the case, then that which is Ipsum Esse Subsistens is composed of parts (at least two parts). Another obvious implication of this is that that which is Ipsum Esse Subsistens is no longer that which is Ipsum Esse Subsistens, but that which is Ipsum Esse Subsistens plus a differentiating principle!

Since we have already seen that the first cause(s) is absolutely simple and is just Subsistent Being itself, without being composed of parts, then anything that is Ipsum Esse Subsistens cannot have a differentiating principle, and hence cannot be multiple. This entails that the first cause cannot be plural, and therefore there is only one first cause. Only in this stage of the argument can we claim that the first cause is just one. So, the first cause is one. This also means that everything else other than this first cause is contingent, has its essence distinct from its existence, and is metaphysically/physically composite.

From this comes another difference between the Kalam variation that I am defending here and Craig’s variation. Craig’s variation has the whole universe (with the term “universe” defined as “the whole of created reality”) as a caused thing as part of one of its premises (premise 2), while the version defended in this essay has the whole universe as a caused thing as a consequence of the argument. So, the Kalam defended here cannot be accused of presupposing that the universe as a whole must have a cause, because the whole universe is never used as part of the initial stages.

Can this first cause be material? No, because material things are susceptible to change (again, just like contingency itself and composite things, whether or not matter has existed for all eternity and that “change” is just defined as “mere rearrangement of pre-existing matter” is beside the point here), and to change is to have a cause. But again, the first cause doesn’t have a cause. So, the first cause is immaterial and also unchanging.

The fact that the first cause is immaterial and unchanging means that the first cause is something supernatural, supposing that to be material is to be part of nature. Material things, or things in nature, are also those which science investigates and studies, and since we know that this first cause is immaterial, this means that this first cause is something beyond the reaches of science. It is worthless, then, for the atheist/objector to appeal to scientific evidence in order to counter the inference I am making here. To clash with the argument I’m making here requires that the objector use philosophical principles/arguments against my argument, not scientific ones.

We can go on and on in discussing the nature of this first cause, but for now, let’s just consider one last attribute. Suppose also that we define the word “power” as “the ability to cause something”. For instance, the cold air has the power to make the temperature of the room lower, or that food has the power to energize he who eats it. Since the first cause is only one, which implies that other causal structures ultimately depend on it, this implies that the first cause is the cause of everything else besides itself, because it is the only first cause, and hence the only necessary being there is, which means everything else besides it is contingent and depend ultimately on him. The first cause, then, is maximally great in power, or, is something that we can call omnipotent, since, again, it is the cause of anything besides itself.

Once again, I can still go on and on when it comes to talking about the attributes of this first cause. I can still, for instance, prove that this first cause is personal and is a loving being. But that would require more philosophical ideas to be introduced, so for the sake of simplicity, I won’t go there anymore. Anyhow, I would say that the attributes we have considered are already what can be traditionally classified as divine attributes, or attributes that can be at least predicated[xxii] on God as traditionally defined. Once we establish that this first cause has divine attributes, even if we are not led to a specific form of religious theism, this inference is now at least sufficient to refute atheism.

Now we, all know that to have divine attributes is to be God, and since to be the first cause is to have divine attributes, it follows that, by way of modus ponens reasoning, the first cause is God. Now, if the first cause exists, as we established above, and if the first cause is God, then we can therefore conclude that God exists.

My defense of (5) – (9) can thus be summarized as follows:

 

(16)         If the first cause(s) is contingent, then its existence is explained by something outside itself

(17)         But if its existence is explained by something outside itself, it cannot be the first cause(s)

(18)         But there has to be a first cause(s), given causal finitism

(19)         Therefore, the first cause(s)’s existence is explained by itself

(20)         For one’s existence to be explained by itself is for it to be necessary

(21)         Therefore, the first cause(s) is necessary

(22)         If the first cause(s) is necessary, then the explanation for why it exists is inherent to it; it just has to exist, without any need for an external cause, even in principle

(23)         If it just has to exist, then the least we can say about it is that existence is a part of its essence

(24)         If the first cause(s)’s existence is just a part of its essence, then this implies that the first cause has other parts

(25)         But if it has parts, then in order for it to exist, the parts have to be assembled first, which implies a cause

(26)         But the first cause(s) does not have a cause

(27)         Therefore, the first cause(s) cannot have other parts; or, to put it in another way, the first cause(s) is simple

(28)         If the first cause(s) is (are) simple, then existence isn’t just a part of its essence

(29)         The only alternative is for the first cause(s)’s existence to be identical to its essence

(30)         Therefore, the first cause(s)’s essence is just to exist (IPSUM ESSE SUBSISTENS)

(31)         For there to more than one thing in a kind, there has to be a differentiating principle between the things of a kind.

(32)         So, for there to be more than one first cause, then there should be differences between the first causes

(33)         The first cause is existence itself

(34)         So, for there to be more than one first cause, then these first causes are existence themselves + differentiating principle

(35)         But if that is the case, then the first cause isn’t existence itself

(36)         So, the first cause cannot have a differentiating principle

(37)         Therefore, there cannot be multiple first causes

(38)         Therefore, there is only one first cause

(39)         Material things are corruptible and therefore susceptible to change

(40)         To change is to have a cause

(41)         Therefore, material things have a cause

(42)         The first cause has no cause

(43)         Therefore, the first cause is not material/immutable

(44)         Material things/things in nature are those which are investigated by science

(45)         The first cause is immaterial

(46)         Therefore, the first cause is not something science is able to investigate about and is above nature

(47)         To be above nature is to be supernatural

(48)         Therefore, the first cause is a supernatural being

(49)         To have power is the ability to cause something

(50)         The first cause, being the only first cause, is the ultimate cause of everything else besides itself

(51)         The first cause, then, has power over everything else besides itself

(52)         To have power over everything else is to be omnipotent

(53)         Therefore, the first cause is omnipotent

(54)         The first Cause is necessary (Being itself), simple, one, immaterial, unchangeable, supernatural, and omnipotent

(55)         Being necessary, one, simple, immaterial, unchangeable, omnipotent, and supernatural is to possess divine attributes

(56)         Therefore, the first cause possesses divine attributes

(57)         To have divine attributes is to be God

(58)         Therefore, the first cause is God

(59)         The first cause exists

(60)         Therefore, God exists

 

VI.          Answering more objections[xxiii]

I just wanted to make it clear from the outset that I will not be answering the common or standard objections to first cause arguments one sees widespread on the internet (objections like “Who/what caused God?” or “If God is all-powerful, can He make a stone so heavy that he cannot lift?”) because most, if not all, of them just rest on misunderstandings and hence just expose the embarrassment-worthy ignorance of the objector, rather than vindicate his rejection or doubt against the argument he’s answering.

Instead, I would like to focus on some of the more powerful objections that one rarely sees in popular forums or websites and the like, and are mostly raised by academics in their papers/books, although in the end, I will be responding an objection raised by a “YouTube Atheist”. I will respond to 6 objections, 3 are science-related and 3 are not. I’ll start with the 2 non-scientific objections.

 

Do we understand infinity?

The Kalam argument I am defending here rests on some paradoxes involving infinity. But the objector might say that we do not understand the concept of infinity (or at least not yet), and so I cannot use it as a principle to either prove or disprove anything.

First, I would say that this is a bold, and probably a little naïve, assertion. Modern mathematics has a highly developed branch called infinite set theory. It is therefore more plausible to say that the paradoxes end up with logical contradictions not because we do not understand infinity, but rather because we are able to understand it[xxiv].

Also, I think it is important once more to insist on the fact that causal finitism isn’t identical to universal finitism, or that all actual infinites are impossible. Again, this might be Craig’s view, but this isn’t what causal finitism implies. Causal finitism isn’t against infinities in, say, mathematics. Nor does it say that we cannot have an infinite number of effects and the like. So, other forms of infinities are out of the picture when considering this argument. In order for the objection to work, the objector has to specify and prove that causal finitism is something we do not understand, regardless of other infinites, whether we understand them or not. To add to that, we have to ask the objector what specifically does he not understand in the paradoxes we presented above. Unless he does so, our paradoxes stand.

Third, even if we grant the assertion that we might not yet understand what infinity is, the paradoxes we presented above remain paradoxes unless we can solve them in and of themselves. We should be careful in distinguishing epistemic problems with metaphysical problems. The paradoxes above remain paradoxes, independent of our understanding (or lack thereof) of them and the principles they are built upon. Fourth, it is important to push the objector about what exactly do we not understand about infinity, or at least with the paradoxes presented above, because if all the objector does is to assert that we do not understand infinity without backing that up with reasons, then what is to stop us from saying the same thing about other issues or problems in philosophy? What would stop a theist, for instance, to say that he isn’t an atheist because “he doesn’t understand exactly what atheism is or what atheism is for”? Surely, that will not prove that theism is automatically true, but it does nothing for atheism as well. It just kills the conversation between both sides. For the atheist or the objector to really properly express disagreements with the arguments above, he has to both give reasons as to why we should believe his assertion that we don’t understand infinity and give further objections to the argument I’m defending here. Let’s consider some that they might appeal to.

 

Humean view on Causation

The argument presented above obviously relies on the reality of causation[xxv] in the world. In fact, the very first premise asserts this. But what if an objector is a skeptic when it comes to causation?

Scottish Philosopher David Hume has perhaps formulated the most influential critique to any principle of causality:

We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence, without shewing at the same time the impossibility there is, that any thing can ever begin to exist without productive principle; and where the latter proposition cannot be proved, we must despair of ever being able to prove the former. Now that the latter proposition is utterly incapable of a demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by considering that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct of a cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas, without which it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause.[xxvi]

The point of Hume’s critique is that whatever can be distinguished from one another can be separate from each other, and since causes and their effects are distinguishable, they can be conceived to be separate from each other. And since what is conceivable is possible in reality (it might not have happened in reality yet, but who’s to say it cannot happen in reality in the future?), then it is possible in reality that causes and effects can be separate from each other, or that things pop into existence without a cause. So, the things in the universe that we have observed may be caused, but this doesn’t mean all things in the universe are caused. Maybe some of them just began to exist without any cause at all.

There are a couple of problems with this view[xxvii]. First, Hume and those who are sympathetic to his view considers the imagination as identical to rationalization, or that by “conceivable”, Hume means to say “imaginable”. This is what he is saying when he writes that the possibility of an effect coming into existence without a cause “is plainly possible for the imagination”. But to imagine something isn’t the same as conceiving something, or grasping an idea or concept, through our intellects. To borrow an example of Descartes, it may be practically impossible to imagine, or form a mental image of, a chiliagon, but that doesn’t mean we cannot think of, or conceive of, the concept of chiliagon and understand it. So, Hume’s critique rests on a wrongheaded notion of the powers of the intellect.

The objection also begs the question. Why should we believe that just because two things (causes and effects, for example) can be distinguished from each other, they, therefore, can be separable? Thomists, for instance, do not believe this. To give an example, just because a man’s rationality and animality can be distinguished from each other doesn’t mean a man can exist with rationality only, or animality only. Or, to use another example, just because a triangle’s triangularity and trilaterality are two different things and therefore we can conceive of one without conceiving of the other doesn’t mean a triangle can exist with only one of these properties. So, the Humean has to give a further argument to prove that just because we can conceive of causes and effects separately, this entails that causes and effects can exist separately (specifically, that effects can pop into existence without a cause) in real life.

Lastly, as the philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe pointed out, for Hume to prove his argument, he has to give a proper principle in distinguishing something that pops into existence without a cause from something that was just transferred from one place to another without a cause. So, the Humean might say that we can conceive of a stone that was once non-existent and then suddenly comes into existence here in front of me, but we have to ask: what makes that an instance of something coming into existence uncaused instead of just an instance of teleportation, say? Maybe the stone was just from another location and, for whatever reason, it just suddenly appeared in front of me. But the only way to answer this is for the Humean to appeal to the causes of these events. “To come into existence” is distinguished from “to be moved from one place to another” by way of causality only. The purpose of the Humean critique is to eliminate the necessity of causation, but it has to appeal to the necessity of causation in order to succeed. The Humean critique, then, is self-referentially incoherent.

 

The problem of Scientism

I have made it clear from the very first section of this essay that I won’t be using any scientific evidence for the version of the Kalam that I defend, due to the fact that scientific findings can still be swayed and refuted by future scientific findings. Appealing to them is hence unsafe and, for me, an example of intellectual pride: that scientifically speaking, we know enough, and whatever we know in science is already sufficient to prove God’s existence. I hope I solidified my position on this already, especially through the fact that throughout this essay, I only used philosophical demonstrations in order to support my argument.

However, not all people believe that philosophical demonstrations can prove anything about objective reality. Some believe that when it comes to knowing objective truth, only the natural sciences are reliable. This is the view called scientism.

So how do we demolish the structure of scientism? Simple: we use wrecking balls. And I think there are a couple of strong wrecking balls up in the anti-scientism advocate’s sleeve.

First, scientism, just like the Humean critique on causation, is self-defeating. For scientism to be proven, someone should use scientific proofs to establish it. But there are no scientific proofs that say science is the only reliable source for knowing and investigating objective truth. In fact, I would go far as to say that no scientific proofs can be made for scientism. Why so? Because scientism is itself a philosophical claim. Not only that, scientism rests on a couple of philosophical presuppositions: that the world is real, that it can be investigated rationally, that the scientific method does not contradict the laws of logic, and that the human senses are reliable sources for knowing what is in the external world. Scientism cannot be justified without arguing in a circle.

The believer in scientism might say that philosophy may indeed say true things about objective reality, but this proves that philosophy is actually a branch of the natural sciences, not that there’s a different field separate from science that can be used a tool for investigating truth. If one argues this way, however, then, if we grant this, he has no choice but to engage in the arguments I gave above, since it relies on philosophy and philosophy is just a part of science anyway, the only field that gives us information about reality[xxviii]. So, the original motivation of scientism to discredit philosophy is gone due to this move that made scientism consistent with it. The term “science” becomes trivial as well, with redefining the term as something easily done.

Another problem is that science is limited in its descriptions of the world. Physics, for instance, abstracts from the real world and its concreteness through mathematical equations, thereby giving a very minimal description of reality. To use an analogy, if the world is a building, then physics is only the blueprint. Yes, it describes real features of the building, but it isn’t a complete replica of the building. In fact, it adds some things (i.e. grid lines) that are not in the building, and there are also features of the building that are not in the blueprint (i.e. the building’s color, the architect’s personality). This very fact points to the idea that there must be more than what physics, and science in general, can say, for if science relies on abstractions, then there must be something that they are the abstractions of, something that is beyond the reaches of the scientific method.

The fact that science is very mathematically abstract in its descriptions means that its descriptions are quantitative in nature. Mathematics is the language upon which the book of nature is written, as Galileo put it. But our subjective experiences are qualitative. We don’t perceive numbers or calculations, but rather colors, sounds, tastes, temperatures, and the like, regardless of how these things are scientifically explained. So, again, in order to give a complete description of reality, we have to go beyond the “mathematicizations” of science.

 

Objection from Physics

From there, it should be clear by now what route I’ll be taking if someone says that physics has already shown that there’s no such thing as causation simply because the equations in physics do not appeal to causes or causality. Just because something is absent in a representation in nature doesn’t mean that this very same thing is absent in nature.

And even if we grant that causality is non-existent because physics doesn’t appeal to them, then other things that physics doesn’t appeal to are also non-existent, even if those things are essential to science. Other things, like “events” or “explanations” are out of the picture, just because we don’t see these concepts as being used in scientific equations[xxix]. This ultimately will mean (again, if we grant that the objection is correct) the loss of coherence when it comes to physics, since it will disprove its very foundations.

Consider also that, if we once again grant the argument, even if causality is not present in physics, it is certainly present in other sciences, such as biology. This means that causation is still a real feature of the world, even if it doesn’t apply to everything in the world. This is enough for us to establish (1) of the argument: that there is causation. Not only that, but even atheists or non-theists themselves would appeal to causation to answer philosophical problems such as those related to perception. Once again, if what they’re doing is right, then there is still causation in the world and this is enough to establish (1) and reason from there to the existence of a first cause/God.

I think that Bertrand Russell himself has nailed it when he says that physics doesn’t give us the “intrinsic character” of the things it investigates but only the “abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to – as to this, physics is silent.”[xxx] If what the equations are showing are the properties of that which changes, then change is a real feature of the world. From there one can reason that change requires a cause (if the objector doubts causation then we can just go back to how we refuted Hume) and thereby establish (1) and reason from (1) to the existence of the first cause/God.

 

Causation/PSR versus Quantum Mechanics

Objections to both the reality of causation and the PSR from quantum mechanics are, so far, my personal favorites when it comes to science-related objections. Some of them are similar to the objection from physics we just considered above[xxxi], and so we won’t be focusing on them here. But there’s an objection that says since quantum systems and phenomena are unpredictable, non-deterministic, and open to many forms of interpretation, they therefore undermine causation and the PSR. Is this accusation fair?

No, for this objection rests on a misunderstanding. When someone acknowledges the reality of causation and PSR, this doesn’t automatically mean that everything for him should be deterministic. All that is needed is for the effect/reason produced by the cause or agent to be intelligible, and “intelligible” is not identical with “determinable”. Furthermore, for something to cause another, what’s important is that the cause is sufficient to explain its effect, but this doesn’t amount to the cause being necessary to cause its effect. This understanding of causation is compatible with the non-determinism tied to some interpretations of quantum phenomena[xxxii]. Also, if we bite the bullet and accept the fact that quantum indeterminism entails that the PSR is false, then we would have to confront the problems that flow from that, as we have seen above.

Besides that, one can even argue that quantum mechanics itself necessitates causality. How so? To understand, it is important to give a quick sketch on how Aristotelian metaphysics understand what is called substances[xxxiii].

For Aristotle and his followers, to be a real substance is to be composed of prime matter and substantial form. These two are a substance’s most fundamental parts. A thing’s substantial form is its innate principle of operation. It is where the things get its capacities and powers which are not imposed from the outside, as it were. To give a specific example, the capacity of water to make something wet is something inherent to it given its substantial form. It isn’t like a clock, say, whose time-telling functions are “external” to itself, something given by an artificer. This is the core difference between a natural object and a man-made one: the former has substantial form; the latter lacks it qua man-made object.

Prime Matter, on the other hand, is that which ties the substantial form “down to earth”, you might say, and individualizes that which has a substantial form. The reason why the water in the river and the water in a water bottle are two different instances of water is because they are distinct in prime matter, even if they share a common substantial form.

There’s more to be said here, of course, and what I’ve given above is just a brief description of the said metaphysical concepts. It will require a different essay – or even a book, perhaps – to be able to dissect properly the doctrine of matter and form. What is important here is for use to understand the basics. Anyhow, if the Aristotelian concept of matter and form is correct, then (1) materialistic reductionism is false, since all the parts of a substance, regardless of size, will ultimately be grounded in the whole. Specifically, all the parts will have the composition of form and matter as foundation. Also (2) this means that all material things, natural or artificial, require a cause(s), since something (or someone, when it comes to procreation) has to conjoin prime matter and substantial form together. Why can’t we say that it is prime matter that causes itself and the substantial form to be joined into a single composite, or vice versa? Because prime matter, in and of itself, does not exist. It is just what we call pure potentiality. It is, by itself, just a passive aspect of material things, and so require a substantial form to be conjoined to it in order to exist and operate. To say that prime matter can do anything by itself (let alone cause itself and a substantial form to be conjoined) apart from any substantial form is an impossibility.

The same thing applies to substantial forms. For a substantial form to be operative requires that it be tied down into a specific thing by prime matter, otherwise it is also un-concretized and therefore causally inert. To say that substantial forms can do anything apart from prime matter is also an impossibility. We have to posit, then, a cause external to both a thing’s prime matter and substantial form in order for that specific natural thing to exist.

Why reject the alternative to hylomorphism, namely, materialistic reductionism (or atomism, as some might call it; any variation of it is beside the point, I believe) that says that parts are more fundamental to its whole, rather than vice versa? There are multiple reasons, but suffice it to say now that such reductionism is self-defeating[xxxiv].

Consider a natural object O. According to materialistic reductionism, O is just, on the most fundamental level, just a bunch of particles arranged “O-wise”. But a problem arises: what makes the particles arranged O-wise the only particles that make up O? What about the particles on the surface that O rests upon? How do we know that they are not part of O? It seems that the only way to answer this is to appeal to O as a whole. But if the reductionist does this, then he explained the parts by using the whole, and yet the whole point of reductionism is to able to explain the whole by using the parts.

If the reductionist tries to escape this vicious circularity by appealing to something outside O, then there is nothing in O to uniquely identify O and nothing in O wherein we can ground the relation between the parts in O. Either way, reductionism fails.

Furthermore, even if we grant reductionism, it actually doesn’t refute the reality of substantial form and prime matter. If anything, it just gives a reinterpretation of it. Specifically, on where we locate the thing’s substantial form and prime matter. If the reductionist says that the most fundamental parts of a thing is the thing’s most fundamental particles, then what the reductionist is saying is that when we come to the thing’s most fundamental particles, there’s nothing more basic than those particles. This is just a different way of saying, it seems, that those particles are the ones with substantial form and prime matter! The whole thing, therefore, isn’t something against the said Aristotelian doctrine. It’s actually piggybacking on the said Aristotelian doctrine.

If reductionism is false and that substantial forms and prime matters are real, then, again, all material objects require a cause, as we’ve seen above. But before we get there, let’s see how quantum mechanics actually vindicates Aristotle, at least with regards to the issue of substantial form and prime matter.

Robert Koons[xxxv], perhaps the most prominent contemporary philosopher who advocates for an Aristotelian interpretation of quantum phenomena, points out a couple of aspects in quantum mechanics that supports the Aristotelian model of matter. The Copenhagen interpretation, for instance, says that, before having interacted with macro-level systems, a particle’s position and momentum are mere potential. This means that micro-phenomena cannot be more fundamental to macro-level systems, since the actualization of micro-phenomena depends on the macro-level objects. Not only does this vindicate the Aristotelian view on material objects, but also the Aristotelian view on causation, namely, that that change, or the bringing about of effects in general, involves the actualization of potentials. From here we can reason toward the necessity of that which is purely actual, that which all actualizations ultimately depend on. And that which is purely actual is, as many know, the Aristotelian description of God.

Now, I’m not saying that the Copenhagen interpretation is the right way of interpreting quantum phenomena (it has problems too, given such paradoxes like Schrödinger's cat). The point of what Koons is saying is that even if the Copenhagen interpretation is right, it does not refute Aristotelian metaphysics[xxxvi].

 Quantum entanglement phenomena also points to the Aristotelian view, given that the individual properties of the entangled particles are irreducible to themselves if considered individually. This is another instance of a whole being more fundamental to the sum of its parts. We are not going to go further into the details for the sake of simplicity. Suffice it to say that if quantum mechanics itself implies Aristotelianism, and Aristotelianism implies causation, then one cannot use evidence from quantum mechanics to refute causation, much less the PSR, which any principle of causation rides upon.

And if quantum mechanics actually affirms causation (or is at least open to its possibility), then quantum mechanics opens up to the possibility of at least first cause from which we can reason out to prove God’s existence.

Anyhow, even if quantum mechanics doesn’t affirm causation, then we can appeal to the answer we used against the objection from physics: causation may not be present, much less needed by, quantum mechanics, but causation is nonetheless present in other sciences. Once again, that’s all we need to argue for the existence of a first cause/God. We can also appeal once more to the fact that an absence of a thing in a representation of nature doesn’t mean the representation of its absence in nature. Science shows too little about the world, meaning, we have to go beyond it in order to form a holistic model of the world, and if this implies that we have to insert the principle of causality and the PSR into the picture, then causation and PSR must be true.

 

“Rationality Rules” and the Grim Reaper Paradox

Let’s end this section with a couple of issues raised by the Atheist YouTuber Stephen Woodford, better known as “Rationality Rules” against causal finitism as the solution to the Grim Reaper paradox. As I am writing this essay, both him and Christian apologist Cameron Bertuzzi of the YouTube channel Capturing Christianity are currently producing a video series/debate about the Kalam Cosmological Argument that Cameron is defending which is similar to mine [xxxvii]. To be exact, they are just on the second video of the series, namely, Woodford’s response to Bertuzzi’s opening statement/video[xxxviii].

I understand that some might consider this move of mine to consider a YouTube atheist’s objection last as something anti-climactic, because there must be some objection(s) that are more intellectually engaging, more academic, than those we see on a pop video-sharing website (I pointed out as well at the start of this section that this is also the reason why I won’t be responding to the very famous internet objections), but this isn’t much of an issue for me. Woodford is a very prominent YouTuber among atheists and skeptics. So, it’s highly likely that many atheists and skeptics will be introduced to concepts like causal finitism through him. For an internet atheist to criticize causal finitism is also a novel thing to do, and so isn’t cliché unlike the many popular objections to theism commonly put forward, so I deemed it worthwhile to consider his objections, even though they’re just short ones, and respond to them.

Woodford gives three objections (he says he has six, but he didn’t give it all) to causal finitism. First, Woodford says that the contradiction that comes from the Grim Reaper paradox, by which Bertuzzi used causal finitism as a solution, is predicated on a temporal beginning, and that if Bertuzzi wants the argument to be applied to the whole universe, he should assume a starting point in an infinite past, which is impossible since an infinite past has no starting point, without which there will be no paradox. The GR paradox, according to Woodford, requires us to “choose a specific segment of time” and “divide the segment infinitely” and use that as the temporal frame where we can insert all the GRs in the paradox. But if we assume an infinite past, no contradiction can come out of this[xxxix].

My primarily answer to this is that we need not assume anything about the universe as a whole in order to argue for causal finitism. Bertuzzi might think he should, but I won’t go down that road. I think this is obvious by now, since there’s nothing in the premises/initial stages of the argument I defended above presupposes anything about the whole universe. It is only by establishing the divine attributes of the first cause that we have said anything about it, but again, anything about the whole universe isn’t part of any of the premises, but only a consequence of the argument by the end.

Woodford also seems to think that the GR paradox should be formulated in a similar way to Thomson’s lamp, wherein we should choose a specific finite temporal progression, say, 10 to 11 pm, and divide that specific progression infinitely, but this is a false assumption. As I’ve said via the argument from the patchwork principle, as long as we have a “framework” where we can fit all the GRs then it is possible that a scenario such as the GR/book club paradox, and a time frame like, say, from an infinite past until tonight at 11 pm, is perfectly fine where the GR paradox can possibly happen. So, his conclusion to this first objection of his – that the contradiction need not be produced if we have an infinite past – is mistaken.

His second objection is that even if causal finitism is true, it won’t get to just a single first cause[xl]. This is true, but the reader of this essay should know better once he’s already at this part of the essay. I have already given reasons why we must think that this first cause should only be one, and that this first cause should be God. So, I won’t be diving too deep into this objection. I will say the same thing with regards to his third objection, namely, that “even if it is the case that certain kinds of large and small denumerable physical infinities are impossible, it does not follow that all kinds of large and small physical infinities are impossible”. Again, the reader of this essay should know better by now. My concern here is only causal finitism, not “all kinds of large and small physical infinities”, so whether or not other physical infinities are possible is not an issue here. Also, I’ve given an argument through the patchwork principle that if we grant the possibility that real events may have an infinite causal history, then there’s no way to avoid the possibility of paradoxical scenarios such as the ones we discovered above. Hence, Woodford’s three objections fail.

 

VII.      Conclusion

So, to summarize everything in this essay, I first distinguished the Kalam argument I defended here from the more known, traditionally formulated Kalam used by many Christian philosophers and apologists such as William Lane Craig and that I myself have a problem with the latter variation. And so, one cannot use, for the most part, objections to Craig’s Kalam to refute my Kalam.

Then, we have seen that there are good reasons to believe that causal finitism is true, and that this implies that there is at least a single first cause. From there, we argued that this first cause must be necessary (or just is Being itself), simple, one, immaterial, unchangeable, supernatural, and omnipotent. Since these attributes are attributes of God, the first cause is therefore God. We have also seen that objections from both philosophy and science don’t work, and so the argument stands.

It is my hope that the unbeliever, wherever he is in the spectrum of unbelief, may be open to the arguments I have presented in here and my defenses of it from a couple of objections we’ve seen. I also hope that this essay may contribute positively to the conversations about the existence of God. I once again would like to thank “Mar” for agreeing with me to discuss this argument. May the both of us and all the readers of this essay/debate series be able to journey toward the truth and have fruitful conversations, not only about this topic, but also of other topics in the future.

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ENDNOTES:

 

[i] I would like to thank Lheanne Jude Salvacion, Mark Steven Pandan, and Micah Espiritu for helping me understand, properly formulate, and answer some objections to the argument I’m defending in this essay and for reading the early draft of this essay.  I also would like to thank David Rafael Bagayaua and Joseth and Carmelo Ariola for agreeing to evaluate and give comments on the argument I’m defending here that I presented to them in powerpoint format. 

[ii] Craig, William Lane (1979), The Kalam Cosmological Argument

[iii] Some might object to (1) by appealing to, say, quantum mechanics; I think people who do so are mistaken in their interpretation of quantum phenomena, but I digress

[iv] See Feser, Edward (2015), Natural Theology must be grounded in the Philosophy of Nature, not Natural Science; in Neo-Scholastic Essays. See also Feser and Standford, Jonathan – Science and Faith Conference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgVh8aJPPN8&t=1392s

[v]  See How did the Universe Begin? (The Kalam Cosmological Argument by William Lane Craig): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N80AjfHTvQY

[vi] For a detailed exposition on this problem, see Feser, Edward, A difficulty for Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument? http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/a-difficulty-for-craigs-kalam_2.html

[vii] Ibid. (Emphasis added)

[viii] See Pruss, Causal Finitism and the Kalaam Argument http://alexanderpruss.com/papers/kalaam.pdf; Koons, Does the Universe have a Cause? In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition, Raymond VanArragon and Michael Peterson (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming. http://robkoons.net/media/b14fdbce97aa227ffff80ddffaf2815.pdf  “The Grim Reaper Kalām Argument: From Temporal and Causal Finitism to God,” In The Kalām Argument, William L. Craig and Paul Copan (eds.), London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming. http://robkoons.net/media/3d211414d9a8a675ffff80beffaf2815.pdf

[ix] See Alexander Pruss Presents a POWERFUL Argument for God (Stanford lecture) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhsFPg3KH84; Source: New Evidence that the Universe Began to Exist (with Dr. Rob Koons) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0X6ism4-KKw&t=2563s

[x] Thomson, J. F., 1954, “Tasks and super-tasks”, Analysis, 15(1): 1–13.

[xi] Bernardete, Jose A (1964), Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics

[xii] See Koons, Does the Universe have a Cause?

[xiii] Pruss (2018), Infinity, Causation, and Paradox

[xiv] Admittedly, I do not know if he has used this scenario in his writings, but he at least used it once in one of his talks. See Alexander Pruss Presents a POWERFUL Argument for God (Stanford lecture) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhsFPg3KH84

[xv] Oppy, Graham (2006), Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity, cited in reasonablefaith.org, Question of the week #422, Grim Reaper Paradox. To be sure, I haven’t read Oppy’s book yet, but as far as I understand the paradox he responds to, it is similar to the GR paradox. I’m open to be corrected with regards to what he really wrote in the book.

[xvi] How did the universe begin? (The Kalam Cosmological Argument by William Lane Craig) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N80AjfHTvQY

[xvii] Pruss, Causal Finitism and the Kalaam Argument, emphasis added

[xviii] I think the right/proper formulation for the PSR will be “whatever is must have an explanation for why it is, and what is is either self-explanatory or explained by something else”, but again, we can settle for this more simplistic version for now.

[xix] See Feser, Edward (2019), Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science

[xx] One need not be a Thomist in order to believe in the concepts of essence and existence. For a contemporary defense of the said Thomistic doctrine, see Feser (2014) Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, and Oderberg, David (2007) Real Essentialism. A separate argument for God’s existence can be made using the two concepts as starting points. For a contemporary defense of the Argument from De Ente et Essentia, See Kerr, Gavin (2014) Aquinas’s way to God: The Proof in De Ente et Essentia

[xxi] “Simple” here is used as a metaphysical, not an epistemological, term. It doesn’t mean “easy to understand”, it just means “that which has no parts”.

[xxii] I say “at least predicated” because not all Theists will say that God’s attributes are just mere predications. Some (and this is a view I am sympathetic to) would say that, given Divine Simplicity, God’s attributes are identical to each other and that God is identical to these attributes. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Divine Simplicity https://www.iep.utm.edu/div-simp/

[xxiii] I will get my objections primarilly from Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics

[xxiv] How did the universe begin? (The Kalam Cosmological Argument by William Lane Craig)

[xxv] For anybody who’s interested, the principle of causation I adhere to is Aquinas’ principle: Nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality (Summa theologiae I.2.3)

[xxvi] Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section III, cited in Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics

[xxvii] Ibid., see also Feser (2017), Five Proofs of the Existence of God

[xxviii] To be clear, I actually think that Philosophy (and even Theology) are kinds of sciences in the Aristotelian sense of the term “science”, which only means “an organized body of knowledge used in order to understand a subject”. The difference between the definition I use and the modern definition is that the modern definition is narrower in scope.

[xxix] Jonathan Schaffer reasons in a similar way. See Schaffer, Jonathan (2007), The Metaphyscis of Causation, Standofrd Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/

[xxx] Russell, Bertrand (1985), My Philosophical Development

[xxxi] One specific example is the objection from Bell inequalities. The objection says that the inequalities “show that there are correlations without a causal explanation” (Feser, 2014). Once again, we cannot just rely on scientific abstractions to show that only those abstractions exist.

[xxxii] Smart, J.J.C. and J.J. Haldane (2003), Atheism and Theism, Second Edition

[xxxiii] See Feser (2019), (2014) and Oderberg (2007) for a thorough treatment on the subject

[xxxiv] Crawford Elder makes a similar point. See Elder, Crawford (2004), Real Natures and Familiar Objects

[xxxv] Koons (2018), Hylomorphic Escalation: An Aristotelian Interpretation of Quantum Thermodynamics and Chemistry, from American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92:159-78; Knowing Nature: Aristotle, God, and the Quantum, in Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, eds., Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, Vol. 1; Cited in Feser (2019) Rob Koons: Aristotle and the Quantum [Torrey Honors Institute] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d5YI-D1KCQQ

[xxxvi] There are indeed more that has to be said with regards to how to interpret quantum phenomena, but that’s a different issue for a different essay. I won’t be diving into those topics here.

[xxxvii] I said that Bertuzzi’s Kalam  is only “similar to mine” because, although, he also uses causal finitism as a backing principle, his way of arguing for the Divinity of the first cause is different from mine.

[xxxviii] Kalam Debate: @Capturing Christianity vs. @Rationality Rules - Steve’s Opening Statement https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdhDIGULJWY&t=503s; see also Kalam Debate: @Capturing Christianity vs. @Rationality Rules - Cam’s Opening Statement https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZD92WaNjJF8&t=663s

[xxxix] Kalam Debate: @Capturing Christianity vs. @Rationality Rules - Steve’s Opening Statement

[xl] Ibid.